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The Congruent Constitution
(Part One): Incorporation
Jay S. Bybee*
In Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore (1833), the Supreme
Court held that the Bill of Rights applied to the federal government
alone. Following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, the Supreme Court reconsidered the rule of Barron. The
Court first reaffirmed the rule of Barron and held that neither the
Privileges or Immunities Clause nor the Due Process Clause made
the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. It then entered a period
of “absorption,” where the Court held that the Due Process Clause
guaranteed some minimal rights found in the Bill of Rights, but
not necessarily the same rights. Ultimately, the Court announced
a congruence principle: incorporated rights would be identical to
textual rights, jot-for-jot. The congruence principle came with a
limitation, however: only select provisions of the Bill of Rights
would apply to the states. Nevertheless, selective incorporation is
ongoing, as the Court has declared three provisions of the Bill of
Rights incorporated in the last decade, and there are other
provisions in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the Constitution
that the Court may yet declared incorporated.
Incorporation may be the most consequential development
in the Constitution’s history. But the Court’s record on
incorporation is not a flattering one. This Article reviews the
troubled history of incorporation and considers the arguments for
incorporating the remainder of the Bill of Rights and provisions of
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the Constitution beyond the Bill of Rights. The Article concludes
with three points. First, the Court’s current theory based on the
Due Process Clause is textually incoherent. Selective
incorporation is descriptive of what the Court has done, but it is
not a theory of interpretation. There are better theories available,
but so far, the Court has resisted any additional changes in its
approach. Second, in adopting the congruence principle, the Court
has over-enforced some constitutional provisions and underenforced others. The Court’s congruence principle skews the
choice of the substantive rule because it forces the Court to find a
single rule applicable to all levels of government. Indeed, the
Court’s congruence principle may have deterred it from
completing the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Third, the
Article concludes that the congruence principle may be
convenient for the Court, but congruence cannot justify the
Court’s choices. Incorporation has vastly expanded the Court’s
authority to regulate the states, without the sanction of legislation
or amendment under Article V. Incorporation has also
constrained Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Through incorporation the Court has altered both
our federalism and our separation of powers.
This is the first part of a two-part study of the Court’s
congruence principle. The second part will appear in the next
issue of the Brigham Young University Law Review as Jay S.
Bybee, The Congruent Constitution (Part Two): Reverse
Incorporation, 48 BYU L. REV. 2 (2022).
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INTRODUCTION
Each year when I interview prospective law clerks, I ask this
question: “If you could only retain either the even or the odd
amendments, which would you keep?” The answers have varied
widely. Some candidates zero in on a single amendment: “The
Second Amendment, because, well, guns.” (Not hired.) Or: “The
Twelfth Amendment, because, with the advent of political parties,
it cured a structural defect in the relationship between the president
and vice-president.” (Hired.) Put to the Hobson’s choice, most
candidates work through a bevy of considerations: “Do I retain the
odd amendments because of the First, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments, to facilitate speech and voting? Or do I
keep the even, so we have the Fourth and the Fourteenth to
guarantee the sanctity of the home, equal protection, and due
process?”1 Over the years there has been no consensus. Curiously,
the question forces the candidates to choose between identical
clauses—the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One of those
clauses has proven far more consequential than the other in our
1. Each path has consequences most candidates do not anticipate. If we do away
with the odd, we get senators selected by state legislatures and the return of prohibition. If
we keep the odd, we eliminate federal income tax and allow presidents to serve an unlimited
number of terms.
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constitutional history: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The reason is simple: through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has declared
most of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
The path to incorporation has been anything but straight. In
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Court held that the Bill of Rights
applied to the federal government alone.2 Following the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
rule of Barron, denying that the Fourteenth Amendment had made
the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. But as we moved into the
twentieth century, the Court took a more capacious reading of the
Due Process Clause, one that recognized substantive due process
rights, many of which were found in the Bill of Rights. Although
the Court continued to deny that the Bill of Rights itself applied to
the states, it said that many of those rights were “absorbed” in the
Due Process Clause. But the Court made clear that absorbed rights
were “less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other
specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.”3 Finally,
mid-century, the Court simply declared that the Bill of Rights itself
bound the states the same as it did the federal government because
“[i]t would be incongruous to have different standards determine
the validity of a claim.”4 The Court called its new theory “selective
incorporation” because not all provisions of the Bill of Rights were
applicable to the states. We may yet see the end of selective
incorporation. In the past decade the Court has declared the Second
Amendment and clauses in the Sixth and Eighth Amendments
incorporated as well.5 And the Court has left open the possibility
that other provisions of the Bill of Rights will be incorporated in the
future if they are regarded as “fundamental” or “‘deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.’”6
The scholarship on incorporation, critical and supportive, is
substantial.7 This Article will not cover in detail the drafting history
2. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
3. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
4. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
5. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (Sixth Amendment guarantee of a
unanimous jury); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment).
6. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
7. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998); RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989);
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of the Fourteenth Amendment or the arguments for incorporation
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The focus for this
Article is the Court’s congruence principle—the assumption that
incorporation means that the Bill of Rights embodies a single set of
rules applicable to the states and the federal government. This
Article takes a broader approach to incorporation than the prior
literature. The Article challenges two assumptions we have long
held about incorporation: first, that incorporation is exclusively
about the Bill of Rights and, second, that the congruence principle
is—as a matter of constitutional text, structure, and policy—
inevitable. Once we reassess those assumptions, we should be
skeptical of what the Court has done. The Constitution gave us two
sets of rules, some of which applied to the federal government
alone, some of which applied to the states alone, and some of which
applied to both the federal government and the states. Through

MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION
1049–82 (1953); KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 290–95 (2014); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 117–19 (1988); Akhil Reed
Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against States?, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 443 (1996); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Robert Fairchild
Cushman, Incorporation: Due Process and the Bill of Rights, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 467, 479 (1966);
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); John Raeburn Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1948); Louis Henkin, “Selective
Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Jerold H. Israel, Selective
Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982); Gerard N. Magliocca, Why Did the Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights Fail in the Late Nineteenth Century?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 102 (2009); Stanley
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial
Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949); Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism
Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000); James Y.
Stern, First Amendment Lochnerism & the Origins of the Incorporation Doctrine, 2020 UNIV. ILL.
L. REV. 1501; Symposium, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2009); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the
Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007);
Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and
Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051
(2000) [hereinafter Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise]; Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to
Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457 (2000)
[hereinafter Wildenthal, The Road to Twining]. The debate, with citations to additional
sources, is reviewed in Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra at 1067–78.
We could multiply these citations by including the scholarship devoted to the
subject of incorporation of particular provisions of the Bill of Rights, especially the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. See, e.g., infra note 48.
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incorporation and the congruence principle, the Court has leveled
the differences the Framers embedded in the Constitution, altering
both our federalism and our separation of powers.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, this Article offers a
brief history of the evolution of the Court’s explanations for
incorporation. Part III tests the Court’s explanation for its current
position on selective incorporation. It begins with a discussion of
the remaining provisions of the Bill of Rights that have not been
incorporated and assesses the challenges to their incorporation.
It continues with provisions beyond the Bill of Rights that have
effectively been incorporated or that may be incorporated in
the future.
In Part IV, this Article answers a series of questions about the
implications of the congruent Constitution.8 First, the Article asks
questions about text and mechanics: In a Constitution in which
language matters, is the incorporation doctrine textually coherent?
The Article argues that the Court’s current theory is not a sound
one. There are better theories, but they come with their own
interpretive challenges. Second, the Article asks questions about
structure and federalism. As the Court declared multiple
provisions of the Constitution congruent with respect to
protections secured under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Justice Robert Jackson warned that the
process “would lead to the dilemma of either confining the States
as closely as the Congress or giving the Federal Government the
latitude appropriate to state governments.”9 Incorporation did not
simply apply an existing, fixed understanding of the Bill of Rights
to the states. In most cases, those rights were developed in the
context of state cases, and the Court adapted the rules governing
those rights accordingly. This Article suggests that incorporation
8. A word (or two) about terms: “Congruence” in this article takes two forms. First,
rights are congruent when the Court applies the same rule to the states and the federal
government, irrespective of its textual source. The Article will refer to this as “substantive
congruence.” By “textual congruence,” this Article means that the textual sources of a right
are identical for both the states and the federal government. A rule that derives from a single
provision in the Constitution—the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery, for
example—is substantively congruent. It is not textually congruent, however, because we are
not comparing two different rules. We are applying the same rule.
9. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 294 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See Malloy,
378 U.S. at 16–17 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[C]ompelled uniformity . . . achieved either by
encroachment on the States’ sovereign powers or by dilution in federal law enforcement of
the specific protections found in the Bill of Rights.”).

6
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has skewed the development of those rules in such a way that we
are over-enforcing some rules and under-enforcing others. Third,
the Article asks some policy questions. Setting constitutional text
and structure aside, what impels the Court to congruence?
Congruence is convenient for the Court, but is there more than
convenience at stake? At every juncture the Court has changed
directions, it has done so in a way that has enlarged its own power
at the expense of the states and Congress.
The march of the Court has been, inexorably, to a unified set of
rules. The result might be a congruent Constitution, one easily
understood and administered from afar, but it is not a textually or
structurally coherent Constitution. That fact should prompt us to
reflect, if the text is so malleable, why have a written constitution at
all? This Article is the first of a two-part study of the Court’s drive
to create a congruent Constitution—a set of unified rules to govern
both the federal government and the states. The second part will
appear in the next issue of the Brigham Young University Law Review
as The Congruent Constitution (Part Two): Reverse Incorporation.
When we consider the breadth of incorporation together with
reverse incorporation, the Constitution that emerges is one that is
very different from that adopted in 1789 and amended in 1868.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INCORPORATION
This part begins with a brief reprisal of the history of the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, with special emphasis on how
the Court got to the congruence principle and the concerns raised
by various members of the Court.
A.

The Creation of the Bill of Rights

It was August 1789, and Congress was prepared to send twelve
amendments to the states in fulfillment of a promise to create a bill
of rights. Under James Madison’s proposal, what we know as the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Amendments, and
part of the Fifth, would be inserted in Article I, Section 9. The
remainder of the Fifth Amendment, plus the Seventh Amendment,
would be folded into Article III. The Tenth Amendment would
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become Article VII.10 Shortly before the vote, Roger Sherman of
Connecticut objected to amending the Constitution in this way
because it treated the Constitution as ordinary legislation, to be
amended at will. Madison answered that there was “a neatness and
propriety in incorporating the amendments into the Constitution
itself; in the case the system will remain uniform and entire.”11 He
warned that if the amendments were “supplementary,” it would be
“difficult to ascertain to what parts of the instrument the
amendments particularly refer.”12 With those excellent, prescient
points made, the debate devolved into “ill-humour & rudeness,”13
and Madison, fearful of losing a bill of rights altogether, made the
“unavoidable sacrifice.”14
We might not be here if we had followed Madison’s proposed
course of conduct. Like the clauses in Article I, Section 9, most of
the new amendments were phrased in passive voice,15 and they
would have fit seamlessly there. Locating most of the clauses of the
Fifth Amendment in Article III would have left no room for doubt
that the amendment bound the judiciary. Placing the Ninth
Amendment at the end of Article I, Section 9 and making the Tenth
Amendment a separate article would have emphasized that they
were rules of construction, the Ninth constraining enumerated
federal powers in order to protect other, unenumerated rights, and
the Tenth reserving nondelegated powers to the states.
But Sherman prevailed, and the new amendments were added at
the end of the Constitution, raising legitimate questions as to whether
they also applied to the states, and justifying Madison’s concerns.16
10. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451–53 (June 8, 1789) (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds.,
1834). The story is aptly told in Edward Hartnett, A “Uniform and Entire” Constitution; or,
What if Madison had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251–53, 289 (1998).
Two amendments—the first and second on the list—were not ratified, although one was
subsequently ratified as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. For convenience this Article will
refer to the proposed amendments by their number as ratified, not proposed.
11. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 10, at 735–36 (June 8, 1789).
12. Id. at 735.
13. Hartnett, supra note 10, at 257 (quoting Letter from William L. Smith to Edward
Rutledge, Aug. 15, 1789, reprinted in HELEN E. VEIT, KENNETH R. BOWLING, & CHARLENE
BANGS BICKFORD, EDS., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 278 (1991) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY RECORD]).
14. Id. at 258 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Alexander White, Aug. 24, 1789,
reprinted in DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 13, at 287).
15. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1005, 1053 (2011) (considering the use of passive voice in the Constitution).
16. See, e.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 120–21, 127–28 (2d ed. 1829) (arguing that most of the Bill of Rights, except the Sixth
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The matter was finally resolved in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore.17
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion appealed to history—the
amendments were a promise made as a condition to the adoption
of the Constitution—and held that the Bill of Rights applied to the
federal government alone. The states, he reminded us, had their
own constitutions and “[h]ad Congress engaged in the
extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the
several states . . . they would have declared this purpose in plain
and intelligible language.”18 Barron was broadly accepted, and the
Court resisted efforts to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states.19
B.

The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation

Barron ended the debate over whether the Bill of Rights applied
to the states but not the debate over whether it should apply.
During the 1866 debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, various
members of Congress suggested that those amendments were
among the “privileges or immunities” of citizenship in the United
States and would become applicable through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.20 When the Court’s disastrous decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases21 limited the scope of the Privileges or Immunities
and Seventh Amendments, applied to the states). See also Henkin, supra note 7, at 77 (“[M]ost
of the Bill of Rights is addressed at large, not expressly to the federal government alone.”).
The main defender of the view that the Bill of Rights bound the states was Professor
Crosskey. See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 7, at 1066–76.
17. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
18. Id. at 249–50. Barron involved a claim under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
19. See, e.g., Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 90 (1858) (Fifth Amendment); Lessee
of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551–52 (1833) (Ninth Amendment). See also Permoli v.
First Municipality, 44 (3 How.) 589, 609–10 (1845) (rejecting a First Amendment claim against the
City of New Orleans for failure to state a claim under the U.S. Constitution).
20. The two most prominent advocates were Representative John Bingham,
sometimes referred to as “the Father of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and Senator Jacob
Howard, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). Representative Bingham’s most articulate
defense of incorporation of the Bill of Rights was offered during the civil rights enforcement
debates in 1871. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham). Nevertheless, during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, other
members of Congress made statements supporting the position that the amendment would
make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1072,
1075 (statement of Sen. Nye); id. at 1629 (statement of Rep. Hart).
21. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Court held that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause prevented the states from abridging the rights of citizenship
in the United States, suggesting that the states could not interfere with the exercise of those
rights against the federal government. See id. at 78–80. The Court did not refer to the Bill of
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Clause, the Court held fast to the rule from Barron.22 Eventually, the
Court began the slow march to incorporation, not through the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, but through the Due Process
Clause. The move occurred in two steps. First, the Court began
recognizing substantive due process rights that had analogous
provisions in the Bill of Rights. Drawing lessons from the same
history that moved the Framers to enumerate such rights in the
Constitution, the Court recognized that similar, but not necessarily
identical, rights applied to the states. The second step involved
formal incorporation of the text of the various clauses in the Bill of
Rights. In other words, the Court moved from asking what rights,
privileges, or immunities inhered in “a concept of ordered liberty,”23 to
asking whether the amendment itself was “fundamental to our scheme
of ordered liberty and system of justice.”24
The prelude to incorporation came in Chicago, Burlington, &
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago.25 In retrospect, it was an odd
Rights as such rights of citizenship, although it did mention the right to peaceably assemble
and the right to petition for a redress of grievances. Id. at 79. In dissent, Justice Bradley
argued that the privileges and immunities included rights found in the Bill of Rights. Id. at
118–19 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
For views that challenge the traditional reading of Slaughter-House, see Newsom,
supra note 7, at 650 (there is nothing in Slaughter-House “that negates a role for the Privileges
or Immunities Clause in the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms against the states, and
that, in fact, a more plausible reading of [Justice] Miller’s opinion specifically preserves such
a role for the Clause.”); Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 7, at 1055 (“[P]ropos[ing]
a fundamental reassessment of [Slaughter-House’s] misunderstood history, with potentially
far-reaching implications for the Court’s future constitutional case law.”).
22. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, 447 (1904) (citing Eilenbecker
v. Dist. Ct. of Plymouth Cnty., 134 U.S. 31, 34 (1890) (“It is well established that the first eight
articles of the amendments to the Constitution . . . have reference to powers exercised by the
government of the United States, and not to those of the States.”); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.
581, 584–85 (1900); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 166 (1887) (“[T]he first ten Articles of
Amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the state governments in respect to
their own people, but to operate on the National Government . . . . [T]hat decision has been
steadily adhered to since [Barron].”); Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274, 278 (1869)
(citing Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)) (accepting that the first ten
amendments do not apply to the states); Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 (7 Wall.) 321, 325–26
(1868) (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243) (rejecting the claim that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments applied to the states).
23. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
24. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010).
25. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See
Wildenthal, The Road to Twining, supra note 7, at 1501–04. The case is broadly assumed to be
the first instance in which the Court enforced a right found in the Bill of Rights against the
states. But a strong argument can be made that the first case was earlier in the term, where
the Court stated that “the question whether private property has been taken for any other
than a public use becomes material in this court, even where the taking is under the authority

10

1.BYBEE1.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11

12/10/22 7:21 PM

The Congruent Constitution: Incorporation

place to start. The city of Chicago planned to extend a street that
required condemning part of the railroad’s right of way. The city
filed a condemnation petition in which it asked that the jury
ascertain the just compensation; the jury fixed the compensation at
one dollar. When the railroad sought review in the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Court had to decide if the case involved any federal
interest. The Illinois Constitution contained both a due process
clause and a takings clause, and its municipal law provided
procedures for seeking a jury award of just compensation, all of
which the city had scrupulously observed.26 Acknowledging that
the Court could neither review the Illinois’s court’s determination
of Illinois law nor overturn the jury’s finding,27 the Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided an
independent check on the state’s actions. The clause, the Court said,
“gr[e]w out of the essential nature of all free governments” and a
just compensation provision was “a principle of natural equity,
recognized by all temperate and civilized governments[.]”28 That,
of course, was presumably what Illinois had in mind when it
codified its own takings clause. The Court concluded that although
it would not review the decision as a matter of Illinois law, the
Court could review the judgment for anything inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment.29 So what standard was it to use? Nowhere
did the Court make explicit reference to the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, but the Court’s reference to “[t]he requirement
that the property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation” was unmistakable.30 Were there standards universal
of the State instead of the Federal government.” Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112, 158 (1896).
26. Chicago, Burlington, 166 U.S. at 228–29. The Illinois Constitution of 1870 provided:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation. Such compensation, when not made by the State, shall be
ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law. The fee of land taken for
railroad tracks, without the consent of the owners thereof, shall remain in such
owners, subject to the use for which it is taken.
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 13 (1870).
27. Chicago, Burlington, 166 U.S. at 242–46. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.”).
28. Chicago, Burlington, 166 U.S. at 237–38. See also id. at 259 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I
approve that which is said in the first part of the opinion as to the potency of the Fourteenth
Amendment to restrain action by a State through either its legislative, executive or judicial
departments, which deprives a party of his property without due compensation[.]”).
29. Id. at 246.
30. Id. at 236.
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to questions of just compensation so that they could be used in a
federal case? The Court did not say and, relying largely on Illinois
cases, affirmed the judgment.
Chicago, Burlington was authored by the first Justice Harlan,
who had articulated a strong position on the incorporation of
the Bill of Rights through both the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and the Due Process Clause.31 Harlan’s opinion for the Court
clearly sounded in vested rights—which he called “natural equity”
and we might call vested rights or substantive due process32—and
it expanded the Court’s appellate jurisdiction immeasurably.
Henceforth, once the Court decided that “natural equity” was
implicated in a case, nothing was beyond the Court’s review
because it could be appealed as a “federal question” in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.33 What appeared to be mere error
correction had been elevated to constitutional status.
Over time the Court surmised that other rights, “the personal
rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National
action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a
denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.”34 Chicago,
Burlington was followed by substantive due process cases requiring
states to observe principles of free exercise, freedom of speech and
of the press, the right of petition, and the sanctity of persons,
houses, papers, and effects with respect to searches and seizures.35

31. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 117–18 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 464–65 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U.S. 581, 608, 612–13 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. Chicago, Burlington, 166 U.S. at 236. That same term the Court decided Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), inaugurating economic substantive due process. See
Wildenthal, The Road to Twining, supra note 7, at 1503.
Justice Harlan tried to build on his opinion in Chicago, Burlington but was
unsuccessful. In Maxwell v. Dow, he cited Chicago, Burlington as evidence that, like the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (which he had not cited in Chicago, Burlington), the
Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand jury and a Sixth Amendment right to a jury
of twelve also applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; otherwise “it would
seem that the protection of private property is of more consequence than the protection of
the life and liberty of the citizen.” Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 614 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15 n.1 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of religion); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (right of
assembly); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech).
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Incorporation had formally begun. Congruence would follow, in
two steps.
1. Absorption and the Two-Track Approach
The Court referred to the first step as “absorption.”36
Absorption, the Court explained, “does not incorporate, as such,
the specific guarantees found in the [Bill of Rights]” but only that
which is a “denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal
sense of justice.”37 For the most part that meant that the Court
would pursue a “two-track” theory: the due process rights imposed
on the states would not be deemed identical to the restrictions on
the federal government found in the Bill of Rights.38 So, for
example, the Court held that under the Due Process Clause, states
must provide for appointment of counsel in capital cases, but not
in other cases,39 although the Sixth Amendment required
appointment in all federal cases.40 And the Court decided that
although the states were bound to respect privacy rights in one’s
person, home, and property, “the ways of enforcing such a basic
right raise questions of a different order[,]” and the exclusionary
rule was not required by the Due Process Clause.41 The two-track
approach recognized that any incongruity in the treatment of
rights held against the states and the federal government was a
consequence of the Constitution’s own federalist principles. “Due
process” might have overlapped with other guarantees in the Bill
of Rights, but the two things were not identical. Justice Holmes
explained that “in view of the scope that has been given to the word
36. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
37. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (“Due Process . . . formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those
envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.”); see Twining, 211
U.S. at 99 (“[S]ome of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against
National action may also be safeguarded against state action . . . not because those rights are
enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they
are included in the conception of due process of law.”).
38. Palko, 302 U.S. at 323 (rejecting appellant’s argument that “[w]hatever would be a
violation of the original bill of rights . . . if done by the federal government is now equally unlawful
by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state. There is no such general rule.”).
39. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
40. Betts, 287 U.S. at 471–73.
41. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). The Court stated that it would present a
“different question” if Congress were, under its Section 5 power, to “attempt[] to make [the
exclusionary rule] binding upon the States.” Id. at 33.
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‘liberty’ [in the Fourteenth Amendment,] . . . it may be accepted
with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to
Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to
govern the laws of the United States.”42 The temptation to equate
the rights applicable to the federal government and the states was
difficult to resist, however, as Justice Jackson wrote in West Virginia
v. Barnette: “The test of legislation which collides with the
Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the principles
of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the
Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process
clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First
become its standard.”43
2. Selective and Jot-for-Jot Incorporation
The final step to congruence came as the Court began hinting
that substantive due process rights might turn on the “explicit
language” of the Bill of Rights.44 Justice Black powerfully advocated
for outright “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights, but in a key case,
Adamson v. California, he failed to secure a fifth vote.45 The following
42. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). See also
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 128 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting).
44. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress[.]”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”).
45. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See also
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black advanced
the theory that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended for the Amendment
to incorporate the Bill of Rights, but he advocated for incorporation through “the fourteenth
amendment’s first section, separately, and as a whole.” Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71. He attached
a lengthy appendix to his opinion with historical materials. Id. at 92–123. Justice Murphy
argued that “the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact” but
resisted the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment was “entirely and necessarily
limited by the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting). But Justice Murphy was
concerned that jot-for-jot incorporation was too limiting, because there might be
“[o]ccasions . . . where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming the fundamental
standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation . . . despite the absence of
a specific provision in the Bill of Rights.” Id.
Black’s dissent so frustrated Justice Frankfurter that he recruited his former
student, Professor Charles Fairman, to respond to it, which he did. NOAH FELDMAN,
SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 315 (2010).
See Fairman, supra note 7, at 5. Black’s dissent and Fairman’s response triggered a broad
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Term the Court commented, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
that “[t]he notion that the ‘due process of law’ guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight
amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them has
been rejected by this Court again and again, after impressive
consideration. . . . The issue is closed.”46 That same Term, however,
the Court took the next step towards full, textual incorporation.
Justice Black, writing for the Court in Everson v. Board of Education,
declared that “The First Amendment, as made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth, commands that a state ‘shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.’”47 Under the new approach, the Court would
insist that the Due Process Clause incorporated more than general
principles, but the text of the Bill of Rights itself. In the years that
followed, Justice Brennan emerged as the principal defender of
“selective incorporation” of the Bill of Rights. For Justice Brennan,
absorbed rights were just a “watered-down, subjective version of
academic debate over the historical bona fides of incorporation. See, e.g., William W.
Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on State
Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Governmental Authority, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 40 (1953). See also
Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968). That debate has not abated. See Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra
note 7, at 1058–59, 1067–78 (recapping the modern developments in the debate).
46. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949).
47. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). Everson was an important symbol for
the new incorporation, because the First Amendment, unlike the remaining amendments,
which were phrased in passive voice, began with the words “Congress shall make no law.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause, in particular, had a significant history, and
it was generally accepted that it was a guarantee that the United States would not establish
a church and a promise to the states of non-interference with state-established churches.
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause has thus generated its own controversy and, in
particular, its own body of academic commentary. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 49–54 (1995);
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical,
Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669 (2013); Jonathan P. Brose, In Birmingham They
Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorporate the Establishment Clause,
24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1998); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause:
Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (1990); Vincent Phillip
Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation,
8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585 (2006); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371; Rupal M. Doshi, Note, Nonincorporation of the
Establishment Clause: Satisfying the Demands of Equality, Pluralism, and Originalism, 98 GEO. L.J.
459 (2010); Russell A. Hilton, Note, The Case for the Selective Disincorporation of the
Establishment Clause: Is Everson a Super-Precedent?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1701 (2007); Note,
Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1700 (1992).
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the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights,” and the Court “in
fact if not in terms[] applied the [same standards].”48 He ultimately
persuaded the Court that “[i]t would be incongruous to have
different standards determine the validity of a claim.”49
In some ways Justice Brennan’s version of selective
incorporation combined the best of absorption and Justice Black’s
full incorporation. It was the marriage of natural law and positive
law. Under selective incorporation, not every provision in the Bill of
Rights was incorporated—like substantive due process, the Court
could pick and choose those provisions that secured “ordered
liberty.”50 But, like Justice Black’s full incorporation, once incorporated,
it brought with it the text of the corresponding amendment and the
same meaning: “protections against the states [were] exactly congruent
with those against the federal government.”51
The movement from absorption to selective incorporation was
not painless. In order to square up federal and state standards, the
Court had to overrule dozens of cases decided under the old
substantive due process regime.52 Justice John Marshall Harlan
resisted the new incorporation and vigorously defended the twotrack regime.53 Harlan argued that “‘incongruity’ . . . is at the heart
48. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 155, 158 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274–76 (1960) (opinion of Brennan, J.). See also William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1961).
49. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
18 (1967) (“[The Court has] increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the [Bill of
Rights] to determine whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law.”).
50. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
51. Henkin, supra note 7, at 74.
52. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment Double
Jeopardy Clause), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (plurality opinion) (Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); id. at
519 (Fortas, J., concurring in the judgment), overruling Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause), overruling
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause), overruling West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel), overruling Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
The process continues. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397, 1404 (2020),
disapproving Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
53. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson had previously objected as well. See Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 288–95 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Then-retired Justice Frankfurter aired his
differences with incorporation in the Harvard Law Review. Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on
“Incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell expressed similar
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of our federal system. The powers and responsibilities of the state
and federal governments are not congruent; under our
Constitution, they are not intended to be.”54 In dissent in Roth v.
United States, for example, he explained that Congress has power to
punish seditious speech, but has “no substantive power over sexual
morality.”55 The states, however, had “direct responsibility for the
protection of the local moral fabric.”56 The difference in function
between the two systems of government was also reflected in the
dangers of censorship: if the federal government acts, the
censorship is uniform nationwide, whereas censorship in one state
leaves other states “free to experiment with the same or bolder
books.”57 A congruent rule brooked another, more subtle danger,
one identified by Justice Jackson: “Adoption of the incorporation
theory today would lead to the dilemma of either confining the
States as closely as the Congress or giving the Federal Government
the latitude appropriate to state governments.”58 Justice Harlan
predicted that one “likely consequence” of demanding congruence
between state and federal governments in the area of criminal
enforcement was
a shift of responsibility in this area to the Federal Government,
with its vastly greater resources. Such a shift [of responsibility] . . .
may in the end serve to weaken the very liberties which the
Fourteenth Amendment safeguards by bringing us closer to the
monolithic society which our federalism rejects.59

That accretion of power was most evident in the newly discovered
“enveloping federal judicial authority.”60
reservations. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39–40 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
52–53 (Powell, J., dissenting).
54. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 27 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting and
concurring in the judgment in part).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 506. See also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457–58 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
58. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 294 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 118 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring in the judgment in part) (pointing
out that under the Court’s approach, approving Florida’s six-person jury meant that a
twelve-member jury was not constitutionally required in federal trials, objecting to “diluting
constitutional protections within the federal system”).
59. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 28 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result); see also
Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 459–60 (stating that by adopting a national standard, the Court could
not “escape the task of reviewing obscenity decisions on a case-by-case basis.”); Malloy, 378
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Concluding Observations

In the end, congruence prevailed. The Court abandoned its twotrack theory in favor of a unified theory of incorporation. The
unified theory came with a compromise, however: jot-for-jot
incorporation would be selective. The Court overruled many of its
prior two-track cases,61 but not all. Vestiges of the prior two-track
regime remained,62 at least for now. Remarkably, in the past ten
years, the Court has deemed three more provisions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states.63 And it has doubled down on
selective incorporation. Justice Alito’s majority opinion in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, declaring the Second Amendment
applicable to the states, reviewed the development of selective
incorporation and emphatically reaffirmed it.64 Justice Stevens,
who had dissented in Heller, again dissented, but channeled the
second Justice Harlan65: “The rights protected against state
infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
need not be identical in shape or scope to the rights protected
against Federal Government infringement by the various
provisions of the Bill of Rights.”66 Incorporation “does not, in itself,
mean the provision must have precisely the same meaning in both
contexts”; it does not require “perfect state/federal congruence.”67
Both Justices Alito and Scalia wrote opinions dismissing Justice
Stevens’s embrace of the two-track theory.68 Following McDonald,
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause applies to the states and again rejected a two-track theory:
“If a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, there is no daylight

U.S. at 15 n.1 (noting that as the Due Process Clause encompasses more rights, it broadens
“federal questions” to be decided by federal courts).
61. See supra note 52.
62. E.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (declining to incorporate the Grand
Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. (11 Otto) 90 (1875)
(declining to incorporate the Civil Jury Clause of the Seventh Amendment). These clauses
are discussed infra in Part II.A.2–3.
63. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (Sixth Amendment guarantee of a
unanimous jury); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment).
64. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 759–66.
65. Id. at 867 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I can hardly improve upon the many passionate
defenses of this position that Justice Harlan penned during his tenure on the Court.”).
66. Id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 868 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 787–88 (opinion of Alito, J.); id. at 791–94 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.”69 In
the 2019–20 Term, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
requires a unanimous jury verdict.70 Again the Court emphatically
rejected “‘dual-track’ incorporation—the idea that a single right can
mean two different things depending on whether it is being
invoked against the federal or a state government.”71 In all of this,
as the Court declared various provisions of the Bill of Rights
incorporated, the Court has paid little attention to any embedded
federalism concerns.
II. THE FUTURE OF INCORPORATION
Incorporation has long been synonymous with the Bill of
Rights, but are there other provisions that might be applied to the
states? It seems clear that the separation of powers principles found
in Articles I, II, and III are structural and will not be incorporated
against the states.72 And in the “one person, one vote” cases, the
Court refused to allow the states to have geographical
representation in the state senates as we do in the U.S. Senate.73
Nevertheless, there are other provisions, within and outside of the
Bill of Rights, that may be subject to incorporation. This Part
considers below the remaining provisions of the Bill of Rights and
their suitability for incorporation and then examines other
constitutional provisions that might feasibly be incorporated.74
Some of the clauses outside the Bill of Rights have a history in the
Court, while others are the subject of academic commentary. But
there are a surprising number of provisions of the Constitution that
have been or may yet be subject to incorporation of the Court’s
current framework.

69. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687.
70. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397.
71. Id. at 1398.
72. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351 (1976); Mayor of Phila. v. Educ. Equal.
League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957)
(plurality opinion); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902). See Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance
of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WMS. U. L. REV. 51, 52 (1998)
(acknowledging that separation of powers provisions do not incorporate, but suggesting that
some provisions might apply to the states through the Guarantee Clause).
73. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 571–77 (1964). See also Sixty-Seventh Minn. State
Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 198–200 (1972).
74. See Wildenthal, The Road to Twining, supra note 7, at 1523–24 n.387.
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The Remaining Provisions in the Bill of Rights

1. The Third Amendment
The Third Amendment need not detain us long. Among the
charges against the king in the bill of particulars section of
the Declaration of Independence was the claim that the king
had “quarter[ed] large bodies of armed troops among us.”75 The
Third Amendment, which followed from state constitutional
provisions,76 provides that “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without consent of the Owner, nor in time
of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”77 The
amendment reinforced Congress’s power “[t]o raise and support
Armies,”78 and the bar on the states to, “without the Consent
of Congress, . . . keep Troops.”79 Although the Third Amendment
seems most applicable to Congress, the term “Soldier” may be
broader than the “Troops” of a standing army and might include
national guardsmen and perhaps other officers of the state.80
The Court has never addressed the Third Amendment, but
the Second Circuit has held that “the Third Amendment is
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment for application to the
states.”81 There is renewed, and creative, interest in the Third
Amendment in the academy.82 One does not have to consult the

75. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 16 (U.S. 1776).
76. See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 21 (1776) (“[N]o soldier ought to be
quartered in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner; and in time of war
in such manner only as the Legislature shall direct.”).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
78. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
79. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
80. Compare id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power “[t]o raise and support
armies”) with id. art. I, § 8, 15 (granting Congress the power “[t]o provide for calling forth
the Militia).
81. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982). See McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010) (citing Engblom).
82. See, e.g., Tom. W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten But Not Gone, 2 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 117 (1993); Alan Butler, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks:
Third Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1203 (2013); Stephen
I. Friedland, The Third Amendment, Privacy, and Mass Surveillance, WAKE FOREST L. REV.
ONLINE (2014); John Gamble, Note, The Third Artefact: Beyond Fear of Standing Armies and
Military Occupation, Does the Third Amendment Have Relevance in Modern American Law?, 6
ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 205 (2015); Josh Dugan, Note, When Is a Search Not a
Search? When It’s a Quarter: The Third Amendment, Originalism, and NSA Wiretapping, 97 GEO.
L.J. 555 (2009); James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic Disasters, 17
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 747 (2008).
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Oracle at Delphi to see that if an appropriate case should come
before the Court, it would declare the Third Amendment
incorporated through the Due Process Clause. The Court could do
so directly or incorporate Third Amendment principles as a special
case of the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in our homes.
2. The Fifth Amendment (Grand Jury Clause)
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides in
relevant part: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury.”83 By its terms, the Clause “confer[s] a right not to
be tried . . . when there is no grand jury indictment.”84 Aside from
that, the Clause presupposes much about the common law history
of the grand jury, because it was adopted as part of the Bill of Rights
nearly without debate or discussion.85 The Clause, for example,
does not provide for the size of the jury and assumes an established
understanding of the difference between “presentment” and
“indictment.”86 The Supreme Court has taken that tack and
assumed that the grand jury “was intended to operate substantially
like its English progenitor,”87 but that has required both the Court
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
84. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 802 (1989). Under Madison’s
proposal, the Grand Jury Clause would have been added to Article III, Section 2, Clause 3.
Hartnett, supra note 10, at 260–61, 296.
85. Cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395–97 (2020) (drawing from common
law, state practices, and early treatises to conclude that the Sixth Amendment requires a
unanimous jury verdict; “the promise of a jury trial surely meant something”).
There was little mention of the grand jury in the debates leading to the
Constitution’s ratification. In the debates in Massachusetts, one delegate characterized the
proposed constitution as “dark and gloomy” and pointed, among other things, that “there is
no provision made in the Constitution to prevent the attorney-general from filing
information against any person, whether he is indicted by the grand jury or not.” 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 110 (J. Elliot, 2d ed. 1891) (reprint 1996)
(“ELLIOT’S DEBATES”) (argument of Mr. Holmes). The objection was met with the argument
that the Massachusetts Constitution similarly did not provide for indictment by grand jury
“yet no difficulty or danger has arisen to the people of this commonwealth.” Id. at 113
(argument of Mr. Gore).
86. According to Blackstone, a prosecutor proposed the indictment and put it
before the grand jury for ratification. A presentment was the grand jury’s own charge,
based on its “own knowledge or observation.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
298 (1769). See Renee B. Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE
L.J. 1333, 1334 (1994).
87. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). See Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (“The Fifth Amendment . . . recognize[s the grand jury] as being
possessed of the same powers that pertained to its British prototype.”).

21

1.BYBEE1.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/10/22 7:21 PM

48:1 (2022)

and Congress to fill in a lot of blanks.88 Despite the history of the
grand jury as a fixture of the common law, only a handful of the
first states provided for one prior to the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, although other states assumed its existence.89 Following the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, many more states adopted grand jury
provisions, and yet a majority of states do not require indictment
by grand jury for all “capital or otherwise infamous crime[s].”90
The Court first rejected incorporation of the Grand Jury Clause
in Hurtado v. California.91 The defendant, Hurtado, had been
charged with capital murder through an information filed by the
district attorney. Hurtado argued that the judgment could not be
enforced in light of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Court began with an extensive discussion of the origins of due
process and the grand jury, including consideration of Magna Carta,
Lord Coke, English cases, and conflicting conclusions from state
supreme courts.92 While acknowledging the lengthy history of the
grand jury in English and American law, the Court concluded that
“due process of law” was not fixed, but must include “the best ideas
of all systems and of every age . . . to draw its inspiration from
every fountain of justice.”93 The Court reasoned that because the
federal requirement of presentment or indictment by a grand jury
was found separate from the guarantee of due process in the Fifth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause did not demand a proceeding
by grand jury: Had the Fourteenth Amendment been intended “to
perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in all the States, it
would have embodied, as did the Fifth Amendment, express
declarations to that effect.”94 For the Court, then, the promise of
protection through a grand jury in the Fifth Amendment was a
positive law guarantee only. The Court would read nothing more
88. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343–46 (1974) (discussing the
principles); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–69, 1871, 1875, 1877; FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
89. See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1193 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (recounting the history); Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights after
McDonald v. Chicago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 187 (2012) (same). See also id. at 188
(stating that at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, twenty-six of thirtyseven states guaranteed a right to indictment by grand jury for felonies).
90. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1435 & n.28 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing “the 28 States that
allow a defendant to be prosecuted for a felony without a grand jury indictment”).
91. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
92. Id. at 520–38.
93. Id. at 531.
94. Id. at 535. Justice Harlan filed a lengthy dissent, drawing from a broad array of
English, American, and state sources. Id. at 538–58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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into the promise of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Court has reaffirmed the “high place [the grand jury]
held as an instrument of justice,”95 it has shown no inclination to reexamine Hurtado since then.96 The logic of Hurtado may appear
textual and formalistic. In another sense, however, Hurtado showed
some flexibility—the concept of due process was not fixed, but
malleable, and could be informed by further thinking by legislators
and constitution-framers; hence, the states were not bound by the
same grand jury requirements as the federal government. Hurtado’s
logic is surely inconsistent with any theory of incorporation based
on the Due Process Clause: Why wouldn’t the same principle apply
to the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the
Unreasonable Search and Seizure and Warrants Clauses of the
Fourth Amendment; the Double Jeopardy, Self-Incrimination, and
Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment; and the Speedy Trial and
Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment? Following the
logic of Hurtado, by reducing those clauses to positive law the
Framers understood that they were related to, but not
comprehended precisely within, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The absorption theory was at least sympathetic to Hurtado
insofar as it offered some flexibility in the idea of due process.
Effectively it put the grand jury on a two-track plan—the states, for
the most part, recognized some role for the grand jury, but the right
did not have to be the same as the federal right; moreover, if a
state’s “inspiration from every fountain of justice,”97 leads it down
a different path, the state may “dispens[e] entirely with the grand
jury in state prosecutions.”98 Of course, under the absorption theory
the Court could have overruled Hurtado in part—requiring that the
states observe some role for a grand jury—without insisting that
95. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
96. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 557 n.7 (1979); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
687–88, 688 n.25 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972); Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962); Costello, 350 U.S. at 362; Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 589–90
(1913). See also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) (rejecting a challenge to Hurtado under
the Equal Protection Clause in a habeas proceeding because it was not exhausted in state
court); id. at 279–80 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that exhaustion was a “nicety” but
irrelevant after Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), because there was substantial overlap
between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
97. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 531.
98. Beck, 369 U.S. at 545. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“The States are not required to use [a grand jury] at all.”).
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the states follow precisely the rules applicable to federal
prosecutions. In contrast, Hurtado is, broadly speaking, consistent
with selective incorporation, but only because the Court called its
method “selective incorporation” to excuse itself from having to
revisit Hurtado and other cases.99 Selective incorporation is itself not
a theory that can explain why some clauses in the Bill of Rights are
incorporated and others are not; it is simply a description of
whatever the Court decides to do. If the Court were to revisit
Hurtado, “selective incorporation” would become “nearly complete
incorporation” and its Procrustean jot-for-jot principle would offer
the states none of the flexibility in the Due Process Clause that the
Hurtado Court promised.
Are there impediments to overruling Hurtado and declaring the
Grand Jury Clause incorporated? Akhil Amar thinks not and has
ventured that the Grand Jury Clause should be incorporated
under the Court’s own due process standards and independent of
Amar’s own carefully crafted theory of “refined incorporation,”
which depends on the Privileges or Immunities Clause.100 On the
other hand, Andrew Hessick and Elizabeth Fisher have argued
that the grand jury is not just a fundamental right of persons, but
a structural right related to the organization of state government
because it “dictate[s] which bodies of government can exercise
particular powers[,]” and as a structural right, should not be
incorporated.101 There is some support for this idea in the Court’s
own historical reconstruction of the grand jury. The Court has
said that the grand jury “serv[es] as a kind of buffer or referee

99. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784 n.30 (2010) (explaining that
Hurtado “predate[s] the era of selective incorporation”). See also Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 64–65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to the Grand Jury Clause and
criticizing selective incorporation as “le[aving us] in the dark as to which [amendments] are
in and which are out”); AMAR, supra note 7, at 220.
100. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 220 (“[A]s to grand juries, it does seem hard to see why
this . . . English liberty is not embraced—doubly—by the privileges–or–immunities and due–
process clauses.”). See also Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1421 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I would resolve this case based on the Court’s longstanding
view that the Sixth Amendment includes a protection against nonunanimous felony guilty
verdicts . . . [and] that this right applies against the States through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause.”); Thomas,
supra note 89, at 204 (concluding that no theories of nonincorporation of the Grand Jury
Clause are defensible).
101. F. Andrew Hessick & Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and Incorporation, 71 ALA.
L. REV. 163, 167 (2019).
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between the Government and the people[,]”102 operates as a
“constitutional fixture in its own right[,]” and thus is not within
the exclusive control of any of the three branches.103 In general,
the Court has not imposed separation of powers principles on the
states through incorporation.104 Whether the grand jury is a sufficient
“constitutional fixture” to merit such deference remains to be seen.
3. The Seventh Amendment (Civil Jury and Re-Examination Clauses)
The Seventh Amendment contains two clauses, a Civil Jury
Clause guaranteeing a jury trial in “[s]uits at common law” whose
value exceeds twenty dollars and a Re-Examination Clause
prohibiting courts from re-examining facts tried to a jury,105
102. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). See also A MAR, supra note 7,
at 85 (observing that the grand jury has been regarded as “a roving commission to ferret
out official malfeasance or self-dealing of any sort and bring it to the attention of the
public at large.”).
103. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Stirone v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960). Although the grand jury is “accorded wide latitude
to inquire into violations of criminal law[,]” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343
(1974), each branch is accorded some check on it: The grand jury shares investigative duties
with the executive, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510 (1978), which helps direct its
activities, United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979). The jury is “subject to the
supervision of a judge,” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972), and dependent upon
it to compel witnesses, Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled in part by
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). Congress has supplied rules for grand jury
proceedings, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–63, 1870.
104. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence may affect the states’ structural choices when, for example, the form of
government has an impact on fundamental due process matters, such as an impartial
magistrate, see, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (holding that the
mayor could not serve as judge where traffic fines and fees funded the city budget); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (same), or voting rights, see, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 142–44 (1971) (suggesting that in an appropriate case a multi-member district might
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
105. The amendment provides in full:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Adjusted for inflation, twenty dollars in 1791 would be equivalent to more
than $630 today. See Ian Webster, Inflation calculator, officialdata.org/us/
inflation/1791?amount=20, (last visited Oct. 18, 2022). Arguably the Seventh Amendment
would have allowed Congress to create federal small claims courts for claims under
twenty dollars. English practice recognized the power of Parliament to create small claims
courts, in which judgments could be issued without a jury. Margreth Barrett, The
Constitutional Right to Jury Trial: A Historical Exception for Small Monetary Claims, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 125, 138 (1987) (recounting the history of the “Court of Requests” or small
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although the Court has sometimes treated the clauses as a single
right.106 Article III of the Constitution provided for trial by jury in
criminal cases,107 but made no mention of civil jury trials.
The omission of any reference of trial in civil cases was raised
briefly towards the end of the Philadelphia convention108 and more
emphatically in anti-federalist editorials and state ratifying
conventions as an argument for the addition of a bill of rights.109
When what is now the Seventh Amendment was presented there
was little opposition and almost no discussion.110
Adopting the Seventh Amendment turned out to be easy
enough, but what did it mean? The Court has said that “the
historical setting in which the Seventh Amendment was adopted
highlighted a controversy that was generated, not by concern for
preservation of jury characteristics at common law, but by fear that
the civil jury itself would be abolished unless protected in express
words.”111 So what “right of trial by jury” did the amendment
“preserve[]”? Broadly speaking, there were two approaches. The
first, discussed (but not favored) by Alexander Hamilton in
Federalist No. 83, was that “causes in the federal courts should be
debtors’ court beginning in the sixteenth century). For an interesting discussion of the
“twenty dollars” provision, see The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1665 (2005).
106. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784 n.30 (2010). But see Google
LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2021) (discussing the Re-Examination Clause);
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (distinguishing “the allocation of
trial functions between judge and jury” from “the allocation of authority to review verdicts”);
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (“[T]he [Re-Examination Clause] of the
amendment is still more important; and we read it as a substantial and independent clause.”)
(footnote omitted).
107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury[.]”).
108. See James Madison, Report in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 585, 587 (Max Farrand ed. 1966) (August 28, 1787) [hereinafter FARRAND] (comments
of Mssrs. Williamson and Gorham and Col. Mason); id. at 640 (additional comments of
Col. Mason).
109. The standard history is Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
110. See Wolfram, supra note 109, at 730 (“[T]he seventh amendment did not attract
attention.”). Under James Madison’s original proposal for a bill of rights, the Seventh
Amendment would have been folded into Article III, Section 2, as Clause 4, thus making
clear that the rule applied in federal courts only. Hartnett, supra note 10, at 259, 296. Note,
also, that the Re-Examination Clause specifies that it applies in “any Court of the United
States[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
111. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973). See also Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 243 (1897) (observing that the Seventh
Amendment was to “deprive the courts of the United States” of authority to re-examine
facts tried by a jury).
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tried by jury . . . [according to] that mode of trial [that] would
obtain in a similar case in the state courts[.]”112 That would
“preserve[]” whatever right to trial by jury the states had carried
from English practices, although it would mean, as Hamilton
noted, that “admiralty causes should be tried in Connecticut by a
jury, and in New York without one.”113 Hamilton thought such a
proposal “capricious” and dependent on “the accidental situation
of the court and parties.”114 A second approach was that the
Seventh Amendment “preserved” a historical right to jury trial
“[i]n [s]uits at common law,” to be determined either by the Court
or by Congress.115 The first approach would have precluded any
possibility of incorporation by decentralizing control over civil jury
trials in federal court. The second approach guaranteed a uniform
rule for all federal courts.
The Supreme Court opted for the second approach, although
without much discussion. Justice Story, riding circuit, did not think
the Seventh Amendment presented any ambiguity: “Beyond all
question, the common law here alluded to is not the common law
of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is
the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our
jurisprudence.”116 In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that what

112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 567 (A. Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
113. Id. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 89 (favoring this approach as “enjoy[ing]
considerable historical support”).
114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 112, at 567–68. See Wolfram, supra note 109, at
712–18. Hamilton may have considered such a proposal unmanageable, but during the same
week Congress transmitted the first amendments to the states for ratification, it adopted the
Judiciary Act. Section 34 of the act (also referred to as the Rules of Decision Act) provided:
“That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.” Judiciary
Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652). Days later,
Congress enacted the Process Act, which provided that in federal courts, the “writs and
executions . . . , in suits at common law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are
now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.” Process Act, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93
(1789). The Process Act expired by its own terms at the end of the next session of Congress.
Id. § 3. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 423–24 (5th ed. 1994). Today, “it is now wholly clear that the right of
jury trial in federal court is governed entirely by federal law, and that state law may be
disregarded.” Id. at 651.
115. See Wolfram, supra note 109, at 720–22.
116. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). See
also Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 432, 446 (1830) (Story, J.) (acknowledging that the
right to a jury was “secured in every state constitution in the Union,” but the Seventh
Amendment was “a fundamental guarantee of the rights and liberties of the people.”).
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the Seventh Amendment preserved was “the appropriate rules of
the common law established at the time of the adoption of that
constitutional provision in 1791.”117
Given the complexity of state jury rules and the Framers’ refusal
to adopt a particular rule of decision, it not surprising that the
Court has thus far declined to declare the Seventh Amendment
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It first so stated shortly after its decision
in the Slaughter–House Cases.118 In Walker v. Sauvinet, the Court held
that “trial by jury in suits at common law . . . [was] not . . . a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship, which the States are
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to abridge[,]” nor did
the Due Process Clause require trial by jury under the same
conditions as the Seventh Amendment.119 The states, the Court
declared, “so far as [the Seventh Amendment] is concerned, are left
to regulate trials in their own courts in their own way.”120 Although
the Court once signaled that it might be willing to revisit Walker,121
The full Court had an opportunity to clarify the rule in its first case under any
provision of the Bill of Rights, a case that arose out of the District of Columbia. Bank of
Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819). Okely had signed a bank note, ostensibly
knowing that Maryland law—made applicable in the District of Columbia by congressional
statute—allowed for summary collection without trial. Okely claimed that he was entitled to
a jury under the Seventh Amendment. The Court held that Okely had effectively waived his
right to a jury trial when he signed the note. The Court failed to address whether the Seventh
Amendment applied in the District of Columbia, whether Congress could make Maryland
law applicable in the land it had seceded to the United States, and whether Maryland law
contravened the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 240. See DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, 112–13 n.143 (1985).
117. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). For the 1791 date, the Court relied on
two criminal cases addressing the Sixth Amendment. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 288–89 (1930); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898). The Court has reaffirmed that
1791 is the relevant date in later cases. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654,
657 (1935).
California has a similar date-fixed rule regarding the right to a jury trial, but the
right is pegged to 1850, when the California Constitution was adopted. C&K Eng’g
Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Cal. 1978).
118. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
119. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. (11 Otto) 90, 92 (1875). See also Edwards v. Elliott, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 557 (1874) (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the
states); id. at 544 (argument of counsel; claiming that New Jersey’s failure to afford his client
a jury trial violated the Privileges or Immunities, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
120. Walker, 92 U.S. (11 Otto) at 92.
121. During the era when the Court was transitioning from the absorption theory of
incorporation to the jot-for-jot theory, the Court took a step towards incorporating the Civil
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the Court has reaffirmed that that principle has been “completely
and conclusively . . . settled[.]”122
Like the Grand Jury Clause, the Civil Jury Clause presumes
much about the nature of a jury. In this regard, the Civil Jury Clause
is not self-executing, and the Court and Congress have filled in the
details.123 Incorporating the Civil Jury Clause would not be
impossible, but it would be messy, because it would require the
Court to sort out what is required by the Constitution and what has
been provided for by statute, rule, or practice. If the Court were to
declare the Civil Jury Clause incorporated, state practices would be
affected in several important ways. First, the states would have to
conform to the Supreme Court’s judgments about what the
common law required in 1791. This would mean that parties would
be entitled to a jury trial in any case in which they would be entitled
to a jury trial in federal court, which might work a substantial
change in state trial procedures.124 Second, the states would have to

Jury Clause of the Seventh Amendment. The Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§
51–60, creates an action in tort for railroad employees. Damages must be determined by a
jury, and suits may be brought in state or federal court. Id. §§ 53, 56. In Minneapolis & St. Louis
Railroad Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1916), the Court had held that a FELA action
brought in Minnesota state court could be tried according to state procedures. See id. at
220–21. But in a subsequent FELA case, Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co., 342
U.S. 359, 363 (1952), the Court required Ohio to conduct a jury trial as to issues of fraud
arising in a FELA action. Ohio provided that a jury could determine issues of negligence; a
judge, questions of fraud, including both law and fact. In a 5–4 decision, the Court wrote that
“the right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by [FELA] to permit
it to be classified as a mere ‘local rule of procedure[.]’” Concurring in the judgment only,
Justice Frankfurter objected that “simply because there is concurrent jurisdiction . . . , a State
is under no duty to treat actions arising under [FELA] differently from the way it adjudicates
local actions for negligence[.]” Id. at 365 (Frankfurter, J., concurring for reversal but
dissenting from the Court’s opinion). FELA, Justice Frankfurter wrote, “does not impose the
jury requirements of the Seventh Amendment on the States[.]” Id. at 367. Otherwise, “the
Bombolis case should be overruled explicitly[.]” Id. at 368. Bombolis was the Supreme Court’s
evidence that “the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury requirement do[es] not apply to the
States.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784 n.30 (2010).
122. Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 217. See, e.g., Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 252 n.17 (2007);
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996); Wagner Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S.
226, 232 (1923).
123. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42, 42 n.4, 51–55, 55 n.10
(discussing the principles); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442, 449–61 (1977) (same);
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78; FED. R. CIV. P. 38–39.
124. A state could still provide for a right to jury trial in cases not required by the
Seventh Amendment. See Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931) (federal court could decide
issue of contributory negligence, even though state law required that such a defense be
determined by a jury).
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provide for unanimous verdicts in civil cases.125 Third, the states
would have to provide for juries in any civil case valued at more
than twenty dollars—which would mean small claims. This would
be a substantial change in practice and additional expense for states
and localities126—expense the federal courts are not put to (at least
in diversity cases) because Congress has required a minimum
amount in controversy, leaving small claims to state courts.127
The Re-Examination Clause raises fewer issues for
incorporation. It is a narrower rule than the Civil Jury Clause and
may be self-executing. That said, a number of state courts have
observed that their constitutions do not have Re-Examination
Clauses and that adopting such a rule would significantly alter
state practices, including rules regarding additur and remittitur.128
All told, the Seventh Amendment could be applied to the states, but
it would come at some cost to the states, and without much
practical benefit, except to give the
Court greater control over state proceedings. The Court’s
failure to incorporate the Seventh Amendment may be the best
evidence of the awkwardness of its congruence principle.

125. See Am. Publ’g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b).
This would require the Court to overrule Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 211, 217 (1916).
126. See, e.g., Cheung v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 124 P.3d 550, 553–54
(Nev. 2005); Wings of the World, Inc. v. Small Claims Ct., 987 P.2d 642, 644–45 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999). See also Barrett, supra note 105, at 126–27 (“When a jury is demanded it adds
tremendously to the cost, time, and complexity of trial, and can easily boost litigation costs
beyond the amount of the claim. Wealthy defendants have learned that merely demanding
a jury as a strategic measure may deter less wealthy small claims plaintiffs from proceeding
with their claims.”) (footnotes omitted).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). There is no constitutional impediment to Congress creating a
small claims court, and, as of 1791, English common law recognized the power of Parliament
to create such courts, where small debts could be recovered without the time and expense of
a jury. See generally, Barrett, supra note 105. Like state legislatures, Parliament could limit the
jurisdiction of small claims courts by imposing a ceiling on the amount of the claims. The
Seventh Amendment appears to have fixed that ceiling at twenty dollars, which, as a
practical matter, would render federal small claims courts useless. One workaround for
Congress would be to provide for small claims courts but permit an appeal to a court in
which a jury trial could be had. Cap. Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1899) (approving
of such a scheme in the District of Columbia). If the Court were to declare the Seventh
Amendment incorporated, the states would have to follow the same model.
128. See, e.g., Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1071 (Alaska 2002) (Bryner, J.,
dissenting in part); Drummond v. Mid-West Growers Coop. Corp., 542 P.2d 198, 206 (Nev.
1975); Jehl v. S. Pac. Co. 427 P.2d 988, 997 (Cal. 1967); Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d 267,
287 (Md. 1998); Freedman v. Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 112 (Mass. 1980); Bunch v. King Cnty.
Dept. of Youth Servs., 116 P.3d 381, 388 n.7 (Wash. 2005).
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4. The Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment is one of the most vexing, least
understood, provisions of the Constitution. Its origins lie in the
deep theory behind the Constitution. The Anti-Federalists
(nominally) opposed the Constitution because it did not have a bill
of rights. The Federalists contended that a bill of rights was not
necessary because the Constitution only granted to the federal
government certain enumerated powers but accepted a bill of
rights as the price of securing ratification. But the idea of a bill of
rights brought fresh concerns to the Federalists—that the
enumeration of some rights might suggest that the people lacked
any claim to other rights not on the list, or, even worse, that the
need for an enumeration of rights implied that the federal
government otherwise had power to restrict those rights.129
Madison explained the problem:
by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power [to
Congress], it would disparage those rights which were not placed
in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned
into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure.130

To prevent such “disparagement,” the Framers proposed what
is now the Ninth Amendment: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”131
129. See Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for
State Constitutional Law, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1229, 1230–31.
130. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 10, at 456. Madison’s original proposal captured
the tenor of his concerns:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the
Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted
merely for greater caution.
Id. at 452.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment also figured in the debates over
the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Nye, for example, argued that the framers of the Bill of
Rights “specified everything they could think of[,]” and then added the Ninth Amendment
to ensure that “no personal or natural right [could] be invaded or impaired by construction.”
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1072 (1866) (statement of Sen. Nye). But both
Representative John Bingham and Senator Jacob Howard omitted the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments from their lists of the federal privileges and immunities that the states would
be forbidden from abridging under the new Fourteenth Amendment. CONG. GLOBE, 42d
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By its own terms, the Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction
(“shall not be construed”), but beyond that, its meaning remains a
source of debate. Were the “certain rights” common law rights?132
natural rights?133 state constitutional rights?134 or something else?135
As a rule of construction, did the Ninth Amendment constrain
the delegated powers?136 or an expansive reading of the Necessary
and Proper Clause?137 Were the “people” individuals or collective
bodies?138 Assuming the Ninth Amendment has something to
tell us about unenumerated rights, are such rights judicially
enforceable?139 Through the middle of the twentieth century, the
Ninth Amendment was cited by the Supreme Court in only a handful
of cases, almost always in tandem with the Tenth Amendment,
and never as the basis for a decision.140 The Court treated both
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st
Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
132. See Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L.
REV. 223 (1983).
133. See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (2006).
134. See Massey, supra note 129, at 1232–33 (“[T]he ninth amendment prevents
Congress from using its delegated powers to contravene an unenumerated federal right
contained within a state constitution.”)
135. See, e.g., Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment,
69 IND. L.J. 759, 762 (1994) (“The Ninth Amendment protects the right to engage in, and
prevents governmental encroachment into, any activity or practice which entails no
possibility of harm to either the actor or other people.”).
136. See Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in Light of Text and History, 2009
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 13, 18 (“[U]nenumerated natural rights are protected through some
combination of political self-control on the part of the political branches (reinforced by the
separation of powers) and equitable interpretation by the courts, which entails the narrow
construction of statutes so as to avoid violations of natural rights.”); Thomas McAffee, The
Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990).
137. Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV.
895, 921 (2008) [hereinafter Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory].
138. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
139. See Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 498, 503 (2011) [hereinafter Williams, The Ninth Amendment] (concluding that “the
Ninth Amendment itself provides an insufficient textual basis for judicial enforcement of
[unenumerated] rights”).
140. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492–93 (1957); Woods v. Cloyd W.
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 143–44 (1948); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94–96
(1947); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330–31 (1936); Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 511 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court may have said little, but as Kurt Lash has impressively
documented, the Ninth Amendment influenced other actors during this period, including
commentators and state courts. Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment,
83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005) [hereinafter Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence].
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amendments as largely a “truism.”141 All of the cases involved
challenges to federal law, with only a sniff of incorporation.142
Debate over the meaning of the Ninth Amendment shifted with
the Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.143 Justice Douglas’s
opinion for the Court, striking down Connecticut’s ban on
contraceptives, famously referred to the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments before holding that “specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations,” that
“create zones of privacy.”144 He quoted the Ninth Amendment, but
without further comment. Concurring, Justice Goldberg developed
the Ninth Amendment theme “to emphasize the relevance of that
Amendment to the Court’s holding.”145 Goldberg read the
Amendment to imply “that there are additional fundamental
rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist
alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the
first eight constitutional amendments.”146 Although “the right of
privacy in marriage” was not guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
to permit a state to infringe it “is to ignore the Ninth Amendment.”147
Confusingly, Justice Goldberg denied both that “the Ninth
Amendment is applied against the States by the Fourteenth” and that
“the Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of
141. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)); see Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 96 (“If granted power
is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, must fail.”).
142. The Court dropped a tease in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell. That case involved a
constitutional challenge by federal employees to the Hatch Act. The Court “accept[ed the]
contention that the nature of political rights reserved to the people by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments are involved,” and “if we look upon due process as a guarantee of freedom in
those fields, there is a corresponding impairment of that right under the Fifth Amendment.”
330 U.S. at 94–95. See also Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 650–53 (1948) (discussing the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments).
143. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
144. Id. at 484.
145. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Both Justice Douglas’s majority opinion and
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence cited several examples of unenumerated rights the Court had
recognized. Two that were prominently mentioned were Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492; id. at 495
(Goldberg, J., concurring). These are the two substantive due process cases that survived the
end of the Lochner era, as Justice Black noted. Id. at 515–16 (Black, J., dissenting) (“the
reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due process philosophy which
many later opinions repudiated”). See Jay S. Bybee, Substantive Due Process and Free Exercise
of Religion: Meyer, Pierce and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 887,
910–18 (1996).
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rights.”148 He reasoned, however, that the Ninth Amendment was
“surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental
personal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal,
infringement.”149 Justice Goldberg, and likely Justice Douglas, had
made two important assumptions about the Ninth Amendment:
First, that whatever rights were “retained by the people” were
judicially cognizable and enforceable; and second, that such rights
were held against federal and state governments. Neither
assumption was obvious from the Ninth Amendment itself. And
although he denied that the Ninth Amendment was incorporated
against the states, Justice Goldberg’s opinion broadly assumed that
the sense of the Ninth Amendment, and perhaps the amendment
itself, applied to the states.
Justice Black dissented and contested both assumptions. He
argued that the Ninth Amendment, “as every student of history
knows,” was “to assure the people that the Constitution in all its
provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government.”150
If any broad, unlimited power to hold laws unconstitutional
because they offend what this Court conceives to be the
‘[collective] conscience of our people’ is vested in this Court . . . it
was not given by the Framers, but rather has been bestowed on
the Court by the Court. . . . Use of any such broad, unbounded
judicial authority would make of this Court’s members a day-today constitutional convention.151

148. Id. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring). In a footnote, id. at 490–91 n.6, Justice
Goldberg cited to a book and two law review articles. Two of the three advocated
incorporation of the Ninth Amendment. See BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT 36 (1955) (“[I]t is fallacious and illogical to insist that by expressly protecting
our liberties from the force of the Federal Government, the same liberties would not be
protected from the force of State governments.”); Norman Redlich, Are There “Certain
Rights . . . Retained By the People”? 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 808 (1962) (“The adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 provides the constitutional basis for judicial enforcement of
[the Ninth and Tenth] Amendments against the states.”). The third was ambiguous.
Knowlton H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309, 323
(1936) (“[The Ninth Amendment] must be a positive declaration of existing, though
unnamed rights, which may be vindicated under the authority of the Amendment whenever
and if ever any governmental authority shall aspire to ungranted power in contravention of
‘unenumerated rights.’”). For background on the history of the debates over the Ninth
Amendment prior to Griswold, see Ryan C. Williams, The Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2155, 2172–76 (2014).
150. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
151. Id. Justice Stewart also dissented, accusing the majority of “turn[ing] somersaults
with history.” Id. at 529 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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In the years since Griswold, the Court has shown little interest
in expanding the Ninth Amendment canon. The Court did cite the
Ninth Amendment in cases involving unenumerated rights,
notably Roe v. Wade.152 More recently, various justices have referred
to the Ninth Amendment, in the main to question whether the
Court has the power to enforce any rights recognized therein.153
Yet, even as the Court has shown less interest, academic interest
in the Ninth Amendment has soared in the past generation.154 I will
not address here the various theories of the Ninth Amendment,
except to say that most commentators do not believe that Ninth
Amendment can be sensibly incorporated.155 Randy Barnett is one
scholar prominent in the current debate who believes that it can

152. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417, 447–48 (1990); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579–80 & nn. 15–16
(1980); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 201 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Lubin
v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n.* (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); Roe, 410 U.S. at 210–11
(Douglas, J., concurring).
153. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91–92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 763 n.2 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 999 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. The works are too numerous to list here. Among the books are RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); DANIEL A. FARBER,
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007); KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT (2009); CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND
THE CONSTITUTION’S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995); THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT
RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDER’S
UNDERSTANDING (2000). Useful histories of the debates may be found in Williams, The Ninth
Amendment, supra note 139, at 504–08; Barnett, supra note 133, at 10–21 (describing five
“originalist models” for the Ninth Amendment); Seth Rokosky, Comment, Denied and
Disparaged: Applying the “Federalist” Ninth Amendment, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 275, 280–94 (2010)
(describing the history, but focusing on the Barnett-Lash debates).
155. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 37–38 (1980); Williams, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 139, at 501 (“the Ninth
Amendment’s literal command has nothing to say about either the existence or enforceability
of claimed rights”); Caplan, supra note 132, at 261–62 (“Nor is it logically possible to
‘incorporate’ the ninth amendment through the fourteenth to apply as a prohibition against
the states, because the ninth amendment was designed not to circumscribe but to protect the
enactments of the states.”); Earl M. Maltz, Unenumerated Rights and Originalist Methodology:
A Comment on the Ninth Amendment Symposium, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981, 985 (1988). Akhil
Amar argues that “the Ninth does not sensibly incorporate in any refined way,” but it doesn’t
matter because any rights prohibited by the Ninth Amendment against federal
encroachment are protected against state encroachment by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. AMAR, supra note 7, at 280.
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(although his argument is carefully nuanced),156 and Kurt Lash has
taken the position that it depends:
If the rule of construction of the Ninth Amendment was
understood as a personal rights guarantee at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the new
understanding of the Clause is as capable of being incorporated
against the states as is freedom of speech or any other personal
freedom listed in the Bill of Rights.157

The most we can say at this time is that the Court has cited the
Ninth Amendment in support of unenumerated rights held against
the states and the federal government; those rights are congruent.
If the Court chooses to go down that path again, it may have to
explain how the Ninth Amendment applies to the states,
incorporation being one open theory.
B.

Beyond the Bill of Rights

1. The Suspension Clause
In August 1787, the Constitutional Convention considered the
following proposition: “The privileges and benefit of the Writ of
Habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government in the most
expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the
Legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions,
and for a limited time not exceeding [ ] months.”158 The proposal

156. Professor Barnett does not argue that the Ninth Amendment is incorporated in
any formal sense but advocates that the Privileges or Immunities Clause granted the federal
government “jurisdiction to protect the unenumerated retained natural rights of the people
for infringement by state governments.” Barnett, supra note 133, at 15; see Randy E. Barnett,
Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41–42 (1988); see also Thomas K.
Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Avenues for Application Against the States, 44 FLA. L. REV.
219 (1992) (suggesting unenumerated rights are protected against the states through
incorporation of the Ninth Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities Clause);
Massey, supra note 129, at 1251; Sanders, supra note 135, at 777; Eugene M. Van Loan III,
Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1968).
157. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 140, at 645; see Lash, A Textual-Historical
Theory, supra note 137, at 922–23. See also MASSEY, supra note 154, at 133–34 (discussing
implications of incorporation of the Ninth Amendment).
158. 2 FARRAND, supra note 108, at 341. The proposal was, nearly word-for-word, taken
from the Massachusetts Constitution. MASS. CONST. OF 1780 pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VII. Article II of
the Northwest Ordinance, adopted in July 1787, provided that “[t]he inhabitants of the said
territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of habeas corpus . . . .” An Ordinance for the
Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio, art. II, (July
17, 1787), reprinted in 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
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was amended to its present form in Article I, Section 9: “The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”159
The Suspension Clause was adopted against a background of
English experience with suspension of the privilege, a common law
right to habeas, and guarantees secured by state constitutions. In
1787, four states—North Carolina, Georgia, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire—affirmatively guaranteed the right to seek
habeas.160 As new states entered the union, all adopted a provision
similar, if not identical, to the Suspension Clause, and by 1868
all the states had some kind of constitutional provision securing
the writ.161
Despite the broad consensus over the importance of the Great
Writ, the Suspension Clause has spawned an extraordinary amount
of debate.162 To begin, we remain unsure of the most fundamental
question—whether the Suspension Clause recognizes a preexisting common-law right to seek habeas relief, or whether
Congress must create such a remedy.163 We are not entirely clear
whether the Framers contemplated that state courts might issue the
writ on behalf of federal prisoners,164 whether federal courts (in the
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 108, at 435; 2 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 85, at 484.
160. Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776–1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 247
(1965); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1971 n.15 (2020)
(“‘There is widespread agreement that the common-law writ of habeas corpus was in
operation in all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled in 1776.’”) (quoting James
Oldham & Michael J. Wishnie, The Historical Scope of Habeas Corpus and INS v. St. Cyr, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 485, 496 (2002)).
161. Oaks, supra note 160, at 248–49.
162. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1969 n.12 (“The original meaning of the Suspension
Clause is the subject of controversy.”).
163. See Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94–95 (1807) (suggesting that without
legislation, “the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be
enacted”). In INS v. St. Cyr, Justice Scalia argued that “[a] straightforward reading of [the
Suspension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence
of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not (except in case of
rebellion or invasion) be suspended.” 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Most
recently, the Court refused to “revisit that question.” Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1969 n.12;
see also id. at 1997 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court wisely declines to explore
whether the Suspension Clause independently guarantees the availability of the writ or
simply restricts the temporary withholding of its operation, a point of disagreement between
the majority and dissent in [St. Cyr] . . . . [N]o majority of this Court, at any time, has adopted
that theory.”).
164. In Tarble’s Case, the Court answered “no.” 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872). See also
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
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absence of legislation) could issue the writ on behalf of state
prisoners,165 or even whether federal courts could issue the writ on
behalf of federal prisoners. And once we get over the question of
whether the writ is implied in the Constitution, we are not even
clear as to who has the right to declare an emergency and suspend
the right.166 And once we know who can suspend the writ, the
question remains, is the suspension only effective against federal
habeas, or does it act to suspend state habeas as well.167
These questions are interesting and consequential, but they are
largely beyond this Article’s present purposes. To the extent these
questions might touch the question of incorporation, the larger
questions surrounding habeas corpus have been mooted by broad
congressional legislation guaranteeing a federal forum for state
prisoners seeking habeas.168 Nevertheless, for our purposes, we
should consider one narrow question remaining in these debates:
Given that the states have secured a habeas remedy in their
own constitutions, may they suspend it on terms different
from those provided in the Suspension Clause—only “when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”?
Indeed, most of the states now have a provision identical to the
Suspension Clause. What would be the purpose of declaring the

165. The issues on this question are well laid out in Lee Kovarsky, Prisoners and Habeas
Privileges Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2014), and Jordan Steiker,
Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862 (1994). See also Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas
Corpus, Part I—Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn’t Make It So: Ex Part Bollman and the
Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of
1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531 (2000).
166. The question of who had the right to suspend the writ was the subject of the
great debate between Chief Justice Roger Taney and President Abraham Lincoln over Ex
Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). See Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 81 (1993).
167. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 596–604 (2002).
168. Most notably, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1996) (authorizing “The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit
judge, or a district court [to] entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”). The postCivil War Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 previously granted courts of the United States “power
to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.” Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
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Suspension Clause incorporated against the states?169 In two words,
federal review. If the federal Suspension Clause applies to the
states, then the federal courts may decide whether there are
sufficient grounds for its suspension, irrespective of a state
supreme court’s decision under the suspension clause in the
state constitution.
Although there is an argument to be made for incorporation of
the Suspension Clause,170 there is some history here, albeit
mercifully short. The Court has held that the Suspension Clause “
is not restrictive of state, but only of national, action.”171
That declaration has been generally accepted, except by Justice
Douglas, who as Circuit Justice was “incline[d] to the view that this
prohibition applies to the States as well as to the Federal
Government.”172 Thus, while there is room for congruence here, the
need is not evident and the Court, so far, has not been inclined to
declare the Suspension Clause incorporated against the states. So
long as we have a comprehensive habeas review through laws such
as AEDPA, it seems unlikely the Court will extend the
incorporation doctrine to the states.173

169. Professor, later Judge, Pollack observed years ago that the availability of statutory
federal review of state confinement makes it “[un]likely that the Court would presently
accept the rather elaborate argument that the Fourteenth Amendment retroactively inflated
the scope of the constitutional privilege to include the newly created federal rights to
protection against state action.” Louis H. Pollack, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 64 (1956).
170. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 7, at 175–77; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 7, at 1129; Michael
Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 120 (1982); Wildenthal, The Road to Twining, supra note
7, at 1526.
171. Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367, 369 (1917).
172. California v. Alorcha, 86 S. Ct. 1359, 1361 (1966) (Douglas, J., sitting as Circuit Justice).
173. If the Court were to take it up, the Court would have to confront the question
whether the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be the
appropriate vehicle for incorporation. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 851 n.20 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I see no reason to assume
that the constitutionally enumerated rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause
should consist of all the rights recognized in the Bill of Rights and no others. Constitutional
provisions outside the Bill of Rights protect individual rights, see, e.g., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2
(granting the ‘Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus’), and there is no obvious evidence that
the Framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause meant to exclude them.”); compare also
Kovarsky, supra note 165 (arguing that state prisoners have a right to federal habeas review
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause) with Steiker, supra note 165 (arguing that state
prisoners have a right to federal habeas review under the Due Process Clause).
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2. The Ports Preference Clause
The Ports Preference Clause forbids preference “by any
Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over
those of another.”174 Under the rule of Barron, the location of the
Ports Preference Clause in Article I, Section 9, clearly signaled that
the restriction bound the federal government, principally
Congress and the Executive; the only branches who could adopt a
“regulation of Commerce or Revenue.”175
Nevertheless, at the first opportunity, the Supreme Court
applied the Ports Preference Clause to the states. In the Passenger
Cases,176 the Court, in a 5-4 decision that produced eight opinions,
invalidated laws from New York and Massachusetts. The New
York statutes authorized the health commissioner to collect $1.50
for each person arriving from a foreign port and $0.25 for each
person arriving from within the United States. With certain
exceptions for vessels arriving from New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island, the monies were collected to go to a marine
hospital.177 The Massachusetts statute required the collection of
$2.00 for each alien arriving on a vessel, to be collected “for the
support of foreign paupers.”178 Justice McLean cited the Ports
Preference Clause together with the Duties and Imposts Clause of
Article I, Section 8, which requires that any “Duties, Imposts and
Excises” enacted by Congress “be uniform throughout the United
States.”179 The justice observed that it was “contended, these
provisions of the Constitution operate only on the Federal
government,” but pointed out that if equality and uniformity of
treatment at the ports was the goal, so long as “the States are free
to regulate commerce by taxing its operations in all cases
where they are not expressly prohibited, the Constitution has failed
to accomplish the great object of those who adopted it.”180

174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
175. The original proposal, which was lengthy, referred repeatedly to prohibitions on
“the Legislature of the United States.” 2 FARRAND, supra note 108, at 410 (August 25, 1787).
176. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
177. Id. at 392–93.
178. Id. at 409.
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
180. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 405–06 (opinion. of McLean, J.).
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Justice Wayne concurred. He declared the Ports Preference Clause
a limitation upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce for
the purpose of producing entire commercial equality within the
United States, and also a prohibition upon the States to destroy
such equality by any legislation prescribing a condition upon
which vessels bound from one State shall enter the ports of
another State.181

McLean’s and Wayne’s arguments did not read the Ports
Preference Clause as a direct regulation on the states, because that
would have required them to concede that the states had the power
to regulate such commerce arriving in their ports. Their arguments
today would be better characterized as sounding in the dormant
commerce clause.
Two years later, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,182 the Court
upheld a Pennsylvania statute that collected a pilotage fee for
vessels failing to employ a local pilot. This time a majority held
that the provision did not violate the Ports Preference Clause,
because “Pennsylvania does not give a preference to the port of
Philadelphia, by requiring [the pilotage fee].”183 The Ports
Preference Clause was cited in Crandall v. Nevada in support of a
right to interstate travel.184
Neither the Passenger Cases, Cooley, nor Crandall gave careful
consideration to the Ports Preference Clause argument, although
opinions in all three cases assumed that it applied to the states.185
The Court corrected course nine years after Crandall, without
comment on its previous position. The argument that the Ports
Preference Clause bound the states was “disposed of by the single
181. Id. at 414 (opinion of Wayne, J.). See also id. at 420 (“[The Ports Preference
Clause] was intended to establish among [the states] a perfect equality in commerce and
navigation. That all should be alike, in respect to commerce and navigation, is an enjoined
constitutional equality, which can neither be interrupted by Congress nor by the States.”);
Williams v. The Lizzie Henderson, 29 F. Cas. 1373, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 1880) (“[The Ports
Preference Clause] has been frequently commented upon in judicial decisions, and held to
be not a limitation upon the power of congress alone in regulating commerce, for the
purpose of producing entire commercial equality between states, but also a prohibition
upon each state to destroy such equality.”).
182. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
183. Id. at 314–15.
184. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43–44 (1868). See also id. at 48
(citing the Passenger Cases).
185. See CURRIE, supra note 116, at 229 (characterizing the argument in the Passenger
Cases as “transparently flimsy”).
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remark that this provision operates only as a limitation of the
powers of Congress, and in no respect affects the States in the
regulation of their domestic affairs.”186 The Court regards the clause
as reinforcing the requirement that duties, imposts and excises be
uniform,187 and the clause is sparingly cited today.188 The Ports
Preference Clause is thus, despite its history, an unlikely candidate
for future incorporation.
3. The Treason Clauses
The Treason Clauses consist of three distinct provisions. First,
Article III, Section 3 defines treason against the United States as
“levying War . . . adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort”; second, it supplies a burden of proof: “two Witnesses to
the same overt Act”; and third, Article III grants Congress the
“Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,” but limits the
punishment so that “no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted.”189 The path to the Treason Clauses was an
interesting one. In June 1776, the Continental Congress, in
anticipation of a declaration of independence, urged the colonies to
enact treason laws, which all but Georgia did.190 The Articles of
Confederation did not contain a treason provision, but provided
that fugitives “guilty of, or charged with, treason . . . in any state”
could be extradited.191 Once the Framers convened in Philadelphia
in 1787, Charles Pinckney proposed that Congress be granted “the
Power to declare the Punishment of Treason.”192 An early draft
from the Committee of Detail proposed that Congress be granted

186. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1877). See also Johnson v. Chi. & Pac. Elevator Co.,
119 U.S. 388, 400 (1886); Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 467 (1886).
187. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 106 (1900).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 587 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., v. United States, 340 U.S. 216, 229 (1951); Thompson Multimedia, Inc.
v. United States, 340 F.3d 1355, 1364–66 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545,
1557–58 (9th Cir. 1990).
189. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cls. 1–2. Congress is granted express power to punish two
other crimes. Unlike the Treason Clauses, Congress can “provide for the Punishment of
counterfeiting” and “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations.” Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10.
190. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES:
COLLECTED ESSAYS 83–84, 116–17 n.35 (1971).
191. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 2.
192. 3 FARRAND, supra note 108, at 598.
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“the exclusive Power of declaring what shall be Treason.”193 Later
drafts produced a proposal similar to our Treason Clauses, omitting
the term “exclusive” and making treason against any state
punishable by the United States.194 Nevertheless, the Framers
divided over whether there “could be no Treason agst a particular
State.”195 Others granted that the United States as a whole had a
greater interest in punishing treason, but argued that there might
“resistence agst the laws of a particular State.”196 In the end, the
Framers agreed not to give Congress the sole power to punish
treason, but defined “Treason against the United States” as
“levying war against them,”197 thus making clear that “resistance
agst. The laws of the U- States as distinguished from resistance agst
the laws of a particular State, forms the line.”198 Over time, every
state except Hawaii has enacted some form of treason clause,
although only forty-three currently have such a provision; many
have provisions identical or nearly identical to the Federal Treason
Clauses.199 There have, however, been relatively few prosecutions
under the state provisions.200
Post-Civil War, treason is rarely charged, although there has
been some renewed interest after 9/11.201 In part, Congress has
supplanted the Treasons Clause by enacting statutes that punish
disloyal acts against the United States, such as espionage.202
Convictions under these statutes are easier because the prosecution
193. 2 FARRAND, supra note 108, at 136.
194. Id. at 182 (“Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war
against the United States, or any of them.”).
195. Id. at 347 (statement of William Samuel Johnson). Compare id. at 345 (statement of
Gouverneur Morris) (favoring “giving to the Union an exclusive right to declare what shd.
be treason”), with id. at 346 (statement of James Madison) (observing that under the proposal
“the individual States wd. be left in possession of a concurrent power to far as to define &
punish treason particularly agst. Themselves.”).
196. Id. at 349 (statement of Roger Sherman).
197. Id. at 349 (describing the votes). When the amended proposal went to the
Committee of Style, it was paired with restrictions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
See id. at 571. The Committee of Style separated the two, placing the Bill of Attainder and Ex
Post Facto Clauses in Article I, § 9, and the Treason Clauses in Article III. Id. at 596, 601.
198. Id. at 349 (statement of Roger Sherman).
199. See J. Taylor McConkie, State Treason: The History and Validity of Treason Against
Individual States, 101 KY. L.J. 281, 292–94 (2012) (listing state provisions).
200. See id. at 300–14 (discussing the history of state treason prosecutions); Alexander
Gouzoules, Dual Allegiance: Federal and State Treason Prosecutions, the Treason Clause, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 53 IND. L. REV. 593, 603–09, 622–23 (2020).
201. See generally Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and
the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (2006).
202. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–94.
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is not bound by the two-witnesses provision and can charge
conspiracies, not just overt acts.203
Given the rarity of federal or state treason prosecutions, the
opportunity for the Supreme Court to confront the incorporation of
the Treason Clauses appears remote. The English origins of the
treason provisions, however, are deep,204 and if the Court were
disposed, it should have little difficulty finding that Article III’s
provisions are “fundamental.”205 There has been renewed academic
interest in the Treason Clauses and a call for them to be
incorporated so as to bind state prosecutions for treason.206 What
kind of case would serve as the vehicle for such a move? There are
two likely scenarios. First, if the state’s own treason clause departs
in any material way from the Constitution’s Treason Clauses.207 So,
for example, if the state did not require two witnesses or defined
treason to permit a treason charge based on conspiracy.208 Second,
even if a state had an identical treason clause, the Court’s
incorporation principles allow it to second-guess state courts in
their construction of identical provisions.209 Incorporation would
give the Court the last word over all treason convictions.
4. The Test Oath Clause
Article VI, Clause 3 provides that executive, judicial, and
legislative officers “both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States.”210 The first part of the
Clause thus requires an oath or affirmation from U.S. and state
officials, but the second part of the Clause—the No Religious Test
provision—only restricts qualifications on persons holding office or

203. See Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 127 (1807).
204. See HURST, supra note 190, at 14–67.
205. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
206. See Gouzoules, supra note 200, at 629–32.
207. See McConkie, supra note 199, at 293–96 (noting differences).
208. See Gouzoules, supra note 200, at 631–32.
209. There may be a broader application of portions of the Treason Clause to
reinforce equal protection principles applied to illegitimacy. See generally Max Stier, Note,
Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the Parents Should Not Matter, 44
STAN. L. REV. 727 (1992).
210. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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public trust under the United States.211 At the time the Constitution
was drafted, most American states imposed some kind of religious
test, requiring state officials to be Protestants, to swear their belief
in the Holy Trinity or the New Testament, or to disavow their
allegiance to Rome.212 In a constitution that did not contain an
Establishment Clause or a Free Exercise Clause, the No Religious
Test Clause was the only clause in the Constitution expressly
referring to “religion.”213
The No Religious Test Clause has been cited by the Court
several times,214 but it has never been the basis for a decision. It
came close in Torcaso v. Watkins,215 when the Court considered a no
religious test clause in the Maryland Constitution, but one that
required “a declaration of belief in the existence of God.”216 The
Court declined to decide whether the No Religious Test Clause
applied.217 Instead, the Court found the test oath “abhorrent to our
tradition” and cited the First Amendment as breaking “new
constitutional ground in the protection it sought to afford to
freedom of religion.”218 The Court concluded that “neither a State
nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’”219 The Court was not
entirely clear whether the Maryland clause violated one or more of

211. Justice Thomas has argued that “The Framers’ prohibition on state-imposed
religious disqualifications for Members of Congress suggests that other types of stateimposed disqualifications are permissible.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 903–04 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,
355 (1867).
212. See Note, An Originalist Analysis of the No Religious Test Clause, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1649, 1651–52 & n.16 (2007). See also U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 825 n.35; Gerard v. Bradley,
The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone
of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 681–83 (1986).
213. Two other sections of the original Constitution implicitly invoke religion. The
presidential oath, like the oath required of other state and federal officials, permits the
president to swear an oath or affirm, affirmation being an accommodation to Quakers. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. Following Article VII there is a recitation that the Constitution was
“Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day
of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven . . . .”
214. E.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 681 (1972); Girouard v. United States, 328
U.S. 61, 65 (1946).
215. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
216. Id. at 489.
217. Id. at 489 n.1 (“Because we are reversing the judgment on other grounds, we find
it unnecessary to consider appellant’s contention that this provision applies to state as well
as federal offices.”).
218. Id. at 491–92.
219. Id. at 495 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
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the religion clauses, and it might easily have rested its decision on
the Free Speech Clause (as compelled speech)220 or even the
constitutional conditions doctrine.221
No matter, Gerard Bradley argues that “Torcaso, if it is to be
grasped at all, affects an ‘incorporation’ of article VI as much as if
the Court expressly said so.”222 Bradley surely is correct and, unless
the Court reverses course in its religion jurisprudence, the question
whether the No Religious Test Clause is incorporated will be
subsumed in other First Amendment provisions, which have
already been incorporated against the states through the Due
Process Clause.223 Nevertheless, at least one federal court has found
the question of incorporation of Article VI to be an open one,224 and
others have assumed sub silentio that the No Religious Test Clause
applies to the states.225 If an appropriate case presented itself, the Court
would surely declare the No Religious Test Clause incorporated.
III. SKEPTICISM ABOUT INCORPORATION
In this Part, this Article evaluates the Court’s current theory
of incorporation from three perspectives. First, in Part III.A, it
considers the textual basis for the Court’s selective incorporation
doctrine. Second, in Part III.B, it examines the challenge of the
Court’s congruence principles. The Article analyzes several
examples where the Court’s choice of a unitary rule results in
under- or over-enforcement of the Constitution and suggests that
the congruence principle has influenced the Court’s choice of rules.
Finally, in Part III.C, the Article asks what policies drive the Court’s
incorporation theory. It concludes that, although a unitary set of
220. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
221. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
222. Bradley, supra note 212, at 718. See also Wildenthal, The Road to Twining, supra note
7, at 1526 (arguing that “[f]or most practical purposes” the Test Oath Clause was
incorporated through Torcaso).
223. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). In McDaniel, the Court struck down a
Tennessee statute prohibiting ministers from serving as legislators. There is no majority
opinion for the Court. Four justices thought that the restriction violated the Free Exercise
Clause. Id. at 626–27 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.). Three justices thought that Torcaso
supplied the rule. Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 642–43 (Stewart, J., concurring).
224. Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1129 (D. Colo. 2006)
(“[W]hether Article VI applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment is an
unsettled question under the law.”), aff’d, 518 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2008).
225. See Cochran v. City of Atlanta, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2017);
Martinez v. Clark County, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1144 (D. Nev. 2012).
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rules is convenient for the Court, the history of due process
incorporation strongly suggests that, with each change, the Court
acquires power over state and federal actors. Incorporation has
altered both our federalism and our separation of powers.
A.

Text: The Failure of Theory

One hundred and fifty-five years after the end of the Civil War,
we are still trying to figure out whether the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Bill of Rights and, if so, which provisions. That is
both surprising and troubling. And the prospects for coherence are
not good, as the Court does not have a theory of incorporation that
will withstand even modest scrutiny.
The Court’s absorption theory survived for half a century, in
part because it demanded so little of the text. Absorption had its
roots in substantive due process—an “ordered liberty”226—but
unlike the Court’s “liberty of contract,”227 the absorption of the Bill
of Rights was more disciplined because incorporation was at least
loosely tied to the constitutional text. It was also federalismfriendly. Although it required the states to conform to a broad set
of norms, it gave the states room to maneuver; it respected the
states’ own constitutions and statutes—what the Court in Hurtado
called “the best ideas of all systems and of every age.”228 States were
free to experiment, for example, with non-unanimous juries, jury
size, and an exclusionary rule, or not, so long as they observed the
broad traditions of the common law. The Court understood that a
written Bill of Rights was a stricter set of rules for the federal
government than the Due Process Clause was for the states.
When the Supreme Court moved to jot-for-jot incorporation,
the Court assumed responsibility for a more rigorous theory of
incorporation. We did not get one. The Court’s current theory,
which saw its most careful exposition in McDonald, is that if the
Court determines the right is fundamental, then the provision in the
Bill of Rights, jot-for-jot, is applicable to the states.229 That is not a
theory of interpretation; it is a description of what the Court has
called “selective incorporation.” It may feel like a cleaner result
than the Court’s fifty-year dance with the two-track theory of
226.
227.
228.
229.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908).
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010).
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absorption, but it is much less intellectually satisfying. The rigor
with which the Court now enforces the Bill of Rights demands from
the Court an explanation for how, precisely, the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, word-for-word. No
explanation has been forthcoming, and the congruence principle
may be convenient for the Court, but it is not itself a theory of how
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment fit together.
The Court has yet to articulate why some provisions of the Bill
of Rights apply word-for-word and why other provisions do not
apply at all. It cannot be true that the Grand Jury Clause, the Civil
Jury Clause, and the Re-Examination Clause are not
“fundamental.” Their English bona fides cannot be disputed. And
we should not accept the Court’s explanation that those clauses are
not incorporated because those decisions “predate the era of
selective incorporation.”230 That fact did not save any other
provisions in the Bill of Rights from incorporation. The Court
overruled dozens of cases to get to its current position on
incorporation of the Bill of Rights; and, in the last decade, it has
decided that three additional provisions of the Bill of Rights are
incorporated.231 That is a serious investment of the Court’s capital.
The Grand Jury and Civil Jury Clauses may be costly and
inconvenient for the states to adopt, but inconvenience to the states
was never a rule of decision for the Due Process Clause. Moreover,
if the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
incorporation of fundamental rights, the Court may have to
confront provisions found outside the Bill of Rights—notably, the
Suspension Clause, the Treason Clauses and maybe even the lowly
Ports Preference Clause.
Incorporation through the Due Process Clause resists a
plausible explanation. There are far more sensible means for
making the Bill of Rights and other provisions applicable to the
states. Incorporation by reference is common in statutes, contracts,
pleadings, and briefs. It is shorthand for acknowledging that things
previously covered are incorporated as if repeated verbatim.
Incorporating the Bill of Rights would have been mechanically
simple and would have given us the precision we should expect
230. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13.
231. See supra note 52, and accompanying text; Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020)
(Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous jury); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause); McDonald, 561 U.S. 742 (Second Amendment).
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from a written document. The Fourteenth Amendment might have
provided, for example, that “amendments III through VII shall
apply to the states.”232 The Constitution is self-referential when it
has to be and that would have been an easy way to indicate which
amendments were incorporated and which were not.233 Or,
mimicking Article I, Section 10, the Fourteenth Amendment might
have stated “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens set forth in
amendments I through VIII.” Or, to be perfectly didactic, the
Fourteenth Amendment could have repeated verbatim the
amendments of the Bill of Rights the states were to observe—just as
the Framers of the original Constitution did when they duplicated
the Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, and Title of Nobility Clauses in
Article I, Sections 9 and 10.234 Such simple mechanisms would
have avoided much confusion. The Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment could have clarified whether qualifications to
common law rights, such as the twenty-dollar provision in the
Civil Jury Clause, were to apply to the states as well. Such attention
to technical detail is not too much to expect from the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, who consciously copied the phrase
“Privileges and Immunities” from the Comity Clause of Article
IV and the Due Process Clause from the Fifth Amendment235
and decided against making the nondiscrimination principle

232. The Eleventh Amendment, for example, leaves no doubt that it was amending
Article III. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in law and Equity . . . .”), with id. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”). Similarly, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment repeals the three-fifths
compromise by mimicking its language in such a way that no one could mistake. Compare
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . .
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons . . . three fifths of all other Persons”), with id. amend. XIV, § 2
(“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State . . . .”).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (“The eighteenth article of amendment of the
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.”).
234. An early proposal by Representative John Bingham would have added a Takings
Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment. Bingham proposed adding “nor shall any state deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor take private
property for public use without just compensation.” BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL
OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 85 (1914).
235. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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applicable to the United States.236 Instead, we have been left to
speculate over incorporation from a high-level of abstraction. For
such a dramatic change in our constitutional structure, we have
the right to demand more.
We can readily identify anomalies in the Due Process Clause
theory. First, for reasons discussed, it is very difficult to draw a line
from the Due Process Clause to jot-for-jot incorporation. No
amount of interpretive handwringing can connect those points.
Incorporation through absorption was an enterprising but
plausible theory; jot-for-jot incorporation was audacious, justified
by nothing more than the Court’s own sense of what would be
“incongruous.”237 Second, if the theory of selective incorporation is
correct, we did not need a Bill of Rights, only a Due Process Clause.
If the Due Process Clause is so capacious, then why was the federal
Due Process Clause buried deep in the Fifth Amendment, and why
does the states’ Due Process Clause follow the Privileges or
Immunities Clause? If everything is substantive due process, we
might have just led off with two Due Process Clauses and saved
everyone a lot of trouble. Whatever other criticism we might level
at such substantive due process, it would at least bring us both
substantive and textual congruence.
There are better theories available. Certainly, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause offers a more coherent, plausible explanation
for incorporation of the Bill of Rights, one that finds some support
in the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment.238 But it
comes with its own challenges. First, is the Privileges and
Immunities Clause even about the Bill of Rights? The phrase
“Privileges and Immunities” is a clear nod to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in Article IV, which, as a rule of comity, referred
to rights conferred by state laws, not the federal Bill of Rights.239
236. The proposed section read “No discrimination shall be made by any State, or by
the United States, as to the civil rights of persons, because of race, color or previous condition
of servitude.” KENDRICK, supra note 234, at 106.
237. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
238. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805–58 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advocating for incorporation through
the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
239. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (“It was undoubtedly the object
of the clause in question to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens
of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are
concerned. . . . [T]he privileges and immunities secured . . . are those privileges and immunities
which are common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws.”).
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If so, the Privileges or Immunities Clause is an equality provision,
requiring the states to provide equal privileges and immunities to
all citizens.240 On the other hand, in the best Hohfeldian sense, our
Bill of Rights can be accurately described as a “Bill of Privileges and
Immunities,”241 in which case the Privileges and Immunities Clause
might be an appropriate vehicle for incorporating the Bill of
Rights.242 Assuming that this reading is plausible, a second question
is whether we are prepared to acknowledge that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause only applies to citizens, and not to persons
generally?243 Third, is all of the Bill of Rights incorporated, just the
first eight amendments, or something less than the first eight
amendments?244 Fourth, if some or all of the Bill of Rights are
incorporated, are they incorporated verbatim? Switching from a
due process theory to a Privileges or Immunities Clause theory
does not necessarily solve the jot-for-jot dilemma. As John Harrison
has explained:
Incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause turns on
whether the definition of a right of distinctively national
citizenship includes its label. If we read it with the label on, the
First Amendment creates a right to be free from congressional
abridgments of freedom of speech. If we read it without the label,
the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech.245

Fifth, is incorporation limited to the Bill of Rights, or are there
other privileges and immunities in the Constitution, such as the
Suspension Clause, encompassed as well?246 What of other rights
that the Court might identify as “fundamental,” but were not reduced
240. See generally NELSON, supra note 7; John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). See also CURRIE, supra note 116, at 347–48; Philip
Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61 (2011).
241. See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1552–55, 1606–10 (1995). See also
Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1018–23.
242. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 32–34, 41–42; CURTIS, supra note 7.
243. See Hamburger, supra note 240, at 2 & n.4.
244. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 41–42, 219–23, 274–76 (proposing “refined
incorporation” and suggesting that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the
Second Amendment, and the Seventh Amendment might not be incorporated).
245. Harrison, supra note 240, at 1466. Others have argued for a different kind of twotrack theory, one that recognizes, for example, different views of the First Amendment as of
1789 as opposed to 1868. See, e.g., LASH, supra note 7, at 299–303; Michael B. Rappaport,
Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against
Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008).
246. See supra note 165 (citing several leading articles on the Suspension Clause).
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to text in the Constitution?247 And finally, what is the date for
determining our privileges and immunities? Is it 1791 when the Bill
of Rights became effective, or 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted, or some other date?248
These are difficult questions, and the academic debates are
sophisticated and detailed—and could have been avoided by more
careful drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. And although the
weight of modern scholarship now leans heavily in the direction
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the mechanism for
incorporation, the Court has shown little inclination to engage. On
the current Court, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have indicated
they would re-examine the incorporation doctrine under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause,249 but they join a short list of
justices who have been willing to explore it. Perhaps a coherent
theory of incorporation is one more casualty of the SlaughterHouse Cases.250
Resolving these intriguing and complicated questions is
beyond the scope of the Article’s present purpose. They are raised
here only to emphasize that there are serious technical questions to
be addressed with respect to incorporation. Regrettably, the Court
has adopted a rote, mechanical formula for incorporation that no
self-respecting lawyer would urge in the construction of a statute
or an ordinary contract.
247. See generally Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
499 (2019). See also Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 409, 435–46 (2009).
248. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 223; Kurt T. Lash, Respeaking the Bill of Rights: A
New Doctrine of Incorporation, 97 IND. L.J. 1439, 1441 (2022) [hereinafter Lash, Respeaking
the Bill of Rights] (proposing “[r]econceptualizing the doctrine of incorporation as
involving a respeaking of the Bill of Rights” as of 1868). See also N.Y. St. Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2138 (2022) (declining to address the relevant date because
“the public understanding of the right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868
was, for all relevant purposes, the same with respect to public carry.”); id. at 2163 (Barrett,
J., concurring) (similar).
249. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1423–24 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Due process incorporation is a demonstrably erroneous
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 691 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
250. See Newsom, supra note 7, at 650 (advocating for a “concededly unorthodox . . .
understanding of Slaughter-House,” one that “would permit courts to lay aside the
historically confused and semantically untenable doctrine of ‘substantive due process,’ a
doctrine that has for years visited suspicion and disrepute on the judiciary’s attempt to
protect even textually specified constitutional freedoms, such as those set out in the Bill of
Rights, against state interference.”).
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B.

Structure: The Over– and Under–Enforcement Problem

Notwithstanding the lack of a credible theory of incorporation,
for the most part we have enthusiastically embraced it, acquiesced
in it, or not noticed it. It is not too late to ask, aside from textual
coherence, what has incorporation cost us? What might we have
relinquished as we embraced congruence and blurred the lines
between the powers of the federal government and the powers of
the states?
For many of the incorporated provisions of the Constitution,
congruence may or may not be textually coherent, but substantive
congruence is harmless enough. The criminal procedure provisions
of the Bill of Rights are broadly accepted.251 Although incorporation
cost us whatever innovation might come from “a single courageous
State . . . serv[ing] as a laboratory [to] try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country,”252 we have
made our accommodation with congruence. The republic neither
flourished nor failed because we tolerated Louisiana and Oregon
maintaining non-unanimous jury verdicts,253 and it will probably
flourish or fail in spite of the Court’s decision in Ramos.254 If, at some
future date, the Court were to overrule its prior decisions and
declare the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause255 or the Seventh
Amendment’s Civil Jury Clause256 incorporated as well, the states
would have to make changes in their procedures, but the states as
states would survive. There are other incorporated provisions of
the Constitution, however, where there are embedded values
where congruence may have undermined federalism in more
significant ways.

251. But see Renee Lettow Lerner, The Resilience of Substantive Rights and the False Hope
of Procedural Rights: The Case of the Second Amendment and the Seventh Amendment, 116 NW. U.
L. REV. 275, 302 (2021) (arguing that incorporation has contributed to the demise of the jury
trial and the increase in plea bargaining).
252. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
But see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 138 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in the result in part) (“It is time, I submit, for this Court to face up to the reality
implicit in today’s holdings and reconsider the ‘incorporation’ doctrine before its leveling
tendencies further retard development in the field of criminal procedure by stifling flexibility
in the states and by discarding the possibility of federal leadership by example.”).
253. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
254. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
255. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
256. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).

53

1.BYBEE1.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/10/22 7:21 PM

48:1 (2022)

The general theory of incorporation posits that the rights held
against the federal government in the Bill of Rights were made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. That
is, the theory is that there is a body of known, existing rights that
may be profitably applied to the states. The Bill of Rights proves the
existence of the rights, but what is their substance? As of 1868, no
clause of the First Amendment had been construed by the Supreme
Court.257 Nor had the Second Amendment.258 Indeed, the body of
Supreme Court law attributable to the Bill of Rights was quite
modest in 1868.259 What did the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment think they were making applicable to the states? A
body of existing law, or whatever rules the Supreme Court
ultimately devised? What of provisions in the Bill of Rights that
have embedded federalism values? Do the provisions of the Bill of
Rights incorporate fully, in modified form, or not at all? These
questions, of course, are core to the textual questions raised in the
prior section.
More significantly, if at the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment the Supreme Court did not have a body of developed
law for any particular clause in the Bill of Rights, might the doctrine
of incorporation affect the choice of the substantive rule?260 Or, to
phrase the question differently, might incorporation skew the
choice of the substantive rule if the Court knows that the rule must
apply equally to federal and state governments, and not just to the
federal government alone under the rule of Barron? The problem
was well framed by Justice Jackson: finding a congruent rule
“would lead to the dilemma of either confining the States as closely
as the Congress or giving the Federal Government the latitude

257. The Court’s first case of any substance addressing any provision of the First
Amendment was Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Supreme Court did not
hold any federal law unconstitutional under the First Amendment until Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), and by that time the Court had a well-established body of cases
involving the states. See Stern, supra note 7, at 1516 & n.95.
258. The Court’s first case dealing with federal firearms regulations was United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
259. See CURRIE, supra note 116, at 439 (“[A]part from an occasional due-process
objection, very few federal actions were challenged in the Supreme Court as offending
provisions of the first eight amendments during the first hundred years.”).
260. There are some scholars, prominently Kurt Lash, who argue that was precisely
the purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause—to recreate the Bill of Rights as of 1868
and make it applicable to the states and the federal government. See Lash, Respeaking the Bill
of Rights, supra note 248.

54

1.BYBEE1.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

55

12/10/22 7:21 PM

The Congruent Constitution: Incorporation

appropriate to state governments.”261 Jackson was speaking from a
position within the absorption tradition—one that avoided the
problem by giving the states greater leeway under the Due Process
Clause than the federal government under the particulars of any
given clause in the Bill of Rights.
For many of the clauses within the Bill of Rights, the substance
of the right was developed first in state cases and later applied to
the federal government. That should prompt an important
question: Is the substantive rule path-dependent? Did rights
develop differently in state cases than they would have in federal
cases? Jot-for-jot incorporation guaranteed that rights held against
the states and rights held against the federal government would be
congruent rights, but did we end up with the right set of rules? It is
going to be difficult to answer that counterfactual with any
certainty, but we have several examples to tease us.
Our first example is the Establishment Clause. The First
Amendment developed almost exclusively in the context of
states and, in general, the Court’s First Amendment “approach
toward states [has been] more searching, not less.”262 At the
framing of the First Amendment, there were well-developed, different
visions of what was the proper relationship between government
and religion.263 The Framers made no attempt to reconcile those
views or to enshrine substantive law in the Establishment
Clause. Rather, the Framers punted the question, by getting
Congress—and, derivatively, the federal courts—out of the

261. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 294 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See
also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (“In the name of
uniform application of high standards of due process, the Court has embarked upon a course
of constitutional interpretation that deprives the States of freedom to experiment . . . [and]
has culminated in the dilution of federal rights”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 136 (1970)
(Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part) (criticizing “a
constitutional schizophrenia born of the need to cope with national diversity under the
constraints of the incorporation doctrine”); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1964) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (“[jot–for–jot incorporation would result in] compelled uniformity . . .
achieved either by encroachment on the States’ sovereign powers or by dilution in federal
law enforcement of the specific protections found in the Bill of Rights”). See also Bryan H.
Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1867–1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153, 273–74 n.393 (2009).
262. Stern, supra note 7, at 1516.
263. See generally John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (1996) (contrasting puritanical and
evangelical views with those of Enlightenment thinkers and civic republicans).
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business of establishing or disestablishing religion.264 Incorporation
changed all of that. Instead of deciding that the Establishment
Clause could not be incorporated against the states because it was
a promise to the states,265 the Court set about to create the law of
the Establishment Clause, and it did so in the context of state cases,
beginning in 1947 with Everson v. Board of Education.266 Did we get
the right rule? Or, as Justice Jackson warned us, has the Court
over-enforced the Establishment Clause against the states and
under-enforced the Establishment Clause against the federal
government?267 In light of the original purpose of the Establishment
Clause as a promise to the states, the answer to Justice Jackson’s
question is “absolutely.” If we only think of the Establishment
Clause as a personal right, it is very difficult for us to know,268 but
the record of enforcement strongly suggests the possibility that the
Court’s rule has inverted the original purpose for the Establishment
Clause. In the years following Everson, the Supreme Court has held
a number of state laws unconstitutional under the Establishment
264. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“Quite simply, the Establishment Clause is best understood as a federalism
provision—it protects state establishments from federal interference but does not protect any
individual right.”).
265. See SMITH, supra note 47, at 49 (“By undertaking to review and regulate churchstate relations at both the national and state levels, the federal judiciary necessarily
committed itself to developing a substantive constitutional law for the subject. It would
therefore be more accurate to say that this decision, far from ‘incorporating’ the religion
clauses, effectively repudiated—and hence repealed—those clauses.” (footnote
omitted)). Indeed, Justice Brennan dismissed the origins of the Establishment Clause as
“historical anachronism by 1868.” Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
There is quite a bit of scholarship dealing with the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause. See supra note 47.
266. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., 374 U.S.; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
267. In some of these cases, the Court invoked its obligation to defer to Congress. E.g.,
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 717 (2010); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens
ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250–51 (1990). It does not appear that there is any similar
obligation with respect to the states.
268. The problem is compounded because the Court’s own approach to the
Establishment Clause has evolved, and dramatically so. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002), disapproving, in part, Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000) (plurality opinion),
overruling Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985),
and Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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Clause, but it has only held federal laws unconstitutional in two
cases. In the first case, the unconstitutional provision was a minor
one;269 the second case was later overruled.270 The Court has
rejected Establishment Clause challenges in all other federal
cases.271 The Court has likely afforded more flexibility to the federal
government than the states.
Our second example suggests that the over-enforcement
problem may not be the states’ burden alone. Linking the states and
the federal government to a single standard may work against the
federal government as well. In Malloy v. Hogan, the Court held that
the states were bound by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to “the same standard applied in federal
prosecutions.”272 At the time that standard was “whether a
confession is incompetent because not voluntary.”273 Miranda
followed two years later. No longer would the Court consider
whether the confession was voluntary; it would not be considered
voluntary unless the police had affirmatively given the suspect
notice of his constitutional rights and verified that he understood
those rights.274 The Court admitted that it “might not find the
defendants’ statements to have been involuntary in traditional
terms,”275 but that the Court’s experience with the “inherently
compelling pressures” of in-custody interrogation required formal
notice to suspects.276 The Court also admitted, however, that it had
“had little occasion in the past quarter century to reach the
269. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682–84 (1971) (severing as unconstitutional a
provision that would have allowed a religious institution to use a government-subsidized
facility for religious instruction after twenty years).
270. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997).
271. See, e.g., Salazar, 559 U.S. at 700; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Mergens, 496 at 226; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988);
Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
See also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968).
There were brief references to the Establishment Clause in federal cases prior
to Everson. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81–82 (1908); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175
U.S. 291, 297 (1899); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1890). In none of these cases did the Court hold the
federal laws unconstitutional.
272. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
273. Id. (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897)).
274. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
275. Id. at 457.
276. Id. at 467.
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constitutional issues in dealing with federal interrogations.”277 Its
experience had come from some thirty-plus state cases on
voluntariness it had decided pre-Malloy.278 In other words, the
Court was largely drawing from state cases decided not under the
Fifth Amendment, but the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth.
The Court’s “reliance on the Fifth Amendment,” Justice Harlan said
in dissent, was “trompe l’oeil.”279 Miranda had changed the
substantive rule for the Self-Incrimination Clause in response to
state cases, and then made the rule applicable to the federal
government as well.280
Congress responded to Miranda two years later in the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by enacting 18 U.S.C. §
3501, entitled “Admissibility of confessions.” Section 3501 attempted
to re-establish the voluntariness standard as the rule of decision in
federal courts.281 The statute was enforced inconsistently for
thirty years,282 until the Fourth Circuit resurrected it.283 The Fourth
Circuit held that Miranda was not a constitutional rule compelled
by the Fifth Amendment, but a prophylactic rule subject to
revision by Congress.284 The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
277. Id. at 463. In McNabb v. United States, federal officers had failed to take McNabb for
prompt arraignment, as required by federal law. 318 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1943). See 18 U.S.C. §
595 (former version), current version re-promulgated as FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). See George H.
Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 706–14 (1946). The
Court decided not to ascertain the Constitutional validity of McNabb’s confession, but to
treat it as an evidentiary matter. The Court said it had the authority to supervise the federal
courts and “maintain[] civilized standards of procedure and evidence.” McNabb, 318 U.S. at
340. It ordered the confessions excluded. See also Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 452
(1957) (excluding confession obtained after “unnecessary delay” in presenting the defendant
before a magistrate).
278. Id. at 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The cases started with Brown v. Mississippi, in the
which the Court first held that it could review confessions obtained through torture (mock
lynching and whipping), which were “clear denial[s] of due process.” 297 U.S. 278, 286
(1936). See id. at 285–86 (“Because a State may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow
that it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted
for the witness stand.”).
279. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
280. Miranda consolidated four cases. Three of the four were state cases (Arizona,
California, and New York). The fourth was a federal case. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491–99.
281. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (“In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States
or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given.”).
282. See Daniel Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions: Implementation of
Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officials and the Courts, 63 GEO. L.J. 305 (1974). See also United States
v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975) (enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 3501).
283. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
284. See id. at 680–93.
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Circuit in Dickerson v. United States.285 Notwithstanding various
pronouncements that Miranda was not a constitutional rule,286 the
Court held that Miranda was a constitutional rule and declined to
overrule it.287 Accordingly, § 3501 was unconstitutional.288
Incorporation had put the Court in a bind.289 The Court has
the power to supervise proceedings in federal courts. But that
power is subject to revision by Congress.290 If Miranda was
prophylactic, the Court had the power to impose Miranda as an
evidentiary rule on the federal courts, but Congress could displace
it with § 3501. But if the Court upheld § 3501, it would have
conceded that Miranda was a rule of supervision, an evidentiary
rule, not a constitutional rule. At a minimum, it would also admit
that the states could also revise their procedures, because the
Supreme Court has no parallel supervisory authority over state
courts.291 The Court could not allow that, so it simply worked
backwards in a reductio ad absurdum: since the Court had
consistently applied Miranda to state proceedings, where the
Court does not have supervisory power, Miranda must have been
a constitutional decision.292 The Court’s longstanding congruence
principle had long meant that whatever rule it applied to the
federal government must apply to the states; in Dickerson it also
meant that the same rule it applied to the states applied to the
federal government. Dickerson is a good example of how
incorporation shapes the substance of the Bill of Rights. Under
other circumstances, the Court might have adopted a rule more
deferential to Congress’s judgment, but it refused to do so when it
would undermine the Court’s new-found authority over the states.
The last example comes from the Free Speech Clause and
introduces a different kind of problem: Court-embedded

285. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
286. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Miranda exclusionary rule
. . . sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the
absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653–54 (1984);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
287. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438–40, 443.
288. Id. at 442–43. See also Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009).
289. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (“[O]ur decisions in [Malloy and Miranda] changed the focus
of much of the inquiry in determining the admissibility of suspects’ incriminating statements.”).
290. Id. at 437.
291. Id. at 438.
292. Id. But see Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2106 (2022) (“[A] violation of Miranda
does not necessarily constitute a violation of the Constitution.”).
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federalism. Early in the development of the First Amendment, the
Court assumed that obscenity was outside of the freedom of
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause.293 The Court first
addressed the question squarely in two cases, one federal and one
state, which were consolidated for argument in Roth v. United
States.294 Although the Court recognized that the federal prosecution
was challenged under the First Amendment and the California
prosecution was challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court did not consider the possibility that obscenity might be treated
differently under those provisions.295 Moreover, the Court cited
federal and state sources generously, suggesting that the First
Amendment protected neither more nor less speech than the states
themselves would under their constitutions and statutes.296 Justice
Harlan concurred in the California case and dissented in the federal
case because there were “different factors . . . involved in the
constitutional adjudication of state and federal obscenity cases,” and
it does not follow that “just because the State may suppress a
particular utterance, it is automatically permissible for the Federal
Government to do the same.”297 Harlan thought the Free Speech
Clause required stricter enforcement against the federal government
than the Due Process Clause.
In Miller v. California, the Court developed its current three-part
test, which includes “whether ‘the average person, applying
contemporary community standards’ would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,”298 a standard it
borrowed from Roth.299 On the other hand, the Court in Miller also
provided that courts must determine “whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value,”300 which appears to be a national standard.301 The
schizophrenia was apparent. The Court wrote:

293. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1878).
294. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
295. Id. at 480 n.3, 481.
296. Id. at 482–85.
297. Id. at 496, 503 (Harlan, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part).
298. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
299. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574–75 (2002) (discussing
the history).
300. Miller, 413 U.S. at 39.
301. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987).
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Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment
limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from
community to community, but this does not mean that there are,
or should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards. . . . It is
neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas,
or New York City.302

Accordingly, the Court held “that obscenity is to be determined
by applying ‘contemporary community standards’ not ‘national
standards.’”303 The Court had previously considered using “a
national standard of decency” in federal cases.304 But following
Miller, the Court announced that the “contemporary community
standards” test was applicable to federal legislation as well,305 but,
confusingly, added that “a district court would . . . be at liberty to
admit evidence of standards existing in some place outside of this
particular district.”306
The Miller test seems to incorporate both a community standard
and some unitary “reasonable person” standard. Had the obscenity
rule developed exclusively in the context of federal cases, the Court
surely would not have chosen “community standards” as a test,
because it would have made federal rules inconsistent nationally.
The nod to community standards is a nod to federalism—and thus
inconsistent with the idea that the Free Speech Clause was
originally a rule for the national government, and not the states. By
contrast, had the Court crafted an obscenity rule for the states, it
probably would have found its way to community standards,
but perhaps not to a national-based “reasonable person” standard.
The result is that Miller is a compromised standard; the Court
arrived at a substantive rule for obscenity that would not have been
developed if the Court had been devising a rule for either the
federal government or the states, but not both. Under the
302. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30, 32.
303. Id. at 37 (citations omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
The Court has reaffirmed that the community standards test from Miller applies to the
internet. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 583.
304. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (plurality opinion of
Harlan, J.).
305. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129–30 (1973).
306. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974). Justice Brennan warned that such
“variegated standards are impossible to discern,” and that national publishers will “retreat
to debilitating self-censorship.” Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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community standards test, the First Amendment may be underenforced against federal legislation; under the reasonable person
standard, the First Amendment may be over-enforced against state
legislation. Incorporation skewed the development of the rule, as
Justice Jackson predicted.
These examples should trouble us. This Article takes no
position on the merits of any particular rule for the Establishment
Clause, police interrogation subject to the Self-Incrimination
Clause, or obscenity subject to the Free Speech Clause. The point is
that some arguments are foreclosed by the congruence principle,
because from the outset we understand that the Supreme Court
demands a single rule and will apply it to both the states and the
federal government. The congruence principle cannot tell us what
the rule will be; it only tells us that whatever rule the Court chooses,
it will be a unitary rule for all levels of government. And that fact
skews the debate over the substantive rule.307 The congruence
principle has shoe-horned us into a single, national debate
moderated by the Supreme Court, resulting in a unitary and fixed
rule, when we might have had fifty-one such debates, presided
over by Congress and state legislatures and moderated by the
courts, and adjustable as necessary.308
Finally, the Court’s current approach to incorporation may
have affected the fact of incorporation itself. Because the Court has
announced that it will apply a single principle to states and the
federal government, the Court may be reluctant to incorporate
provisions that lend themselves to a more pluralistic solution. Two
obvious choices: the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the Civil Jury Clause of the Seventh Amendment. It is difficult
to maintain that these rights are not “fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty and system of justice,”309 but the Court’s own
dogged insistence on a congruence principle may have deterred the

307. See N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276–77 (1964) (“There is no force in
respondent’s argument that the constitutional limitations implicit in the history of the
Sedition Act apply only to Congress and not to the States. . . . [T]his distinction was
eliminated with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the application to the States
of the First Amendment’s restrictions.”).
308. See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 323 (2011) (arguing that state constitutional law should influence similar provisions of
the federal constitution).
309. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010).
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Court from revisiting their incorporation.310 In some sense
incorporation has proven the enemy of . . . incorporation.
C.

Policy: The Value of Congruence

So why have we done this to ourselves? What moves the Court
to right-margin justify the lines of federalism? There are two broad
reasons: convenience and power.
1. The Allure of Convenience
Congruence is an appealing principle, even if it is not a
principle of interpretation. For the Court, congruence—with or
without a well-wrought theory of incorporation311—brought
important advantages. Congruence is convenient for the Court. The
two-track approach of absorption of the Bill of Rights was freeform; it left too much play in the constitutional joints. So long as the
Court thought the states were obligated to ensure some kind of
rudimentary freedom of religion or speech or minimal respect for
the security of our persons, homes, papers and effects, the Court
was drawing two sets of lines: one for the states under the Due
Process Clause and another for the federal government under the
more specific charge of the Bill of Rights. Over time it was simply
easier for the Court to draw one line. It “satisf[ied] a longing for
certainty.”312 The convenience of congruence was not lost on the
Court or the commentators.313 Congruence assured that the Court
would not have to decide if there were two rules and then parse
the differences.
More importantly, even though selective incorporation is
ahistorical, once the Court announced that it would move to jot-forjot incorporation, the Court acquired, ironically, text and legislative

310. Id. at 765 n.13 (“Our governing decisions regarding the Grand Jury Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury requirement long predate the era
of selective incorporation.”).
311. AMAR, supra note 7, at 139 (“[D]espite the importance of the topic and all the
attention devoted to it, we still lack a fully satisfying account of the relation between the first
ten amendments and the Fourteenth.”); Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 934 (1965) (“Whatever one’s views about the historical
support for Mr. Justice Black’s wholesale incorporation theory, it appears undisputed that
the selective incorporation theory has none.”) (footnotes omitted).
312. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
313. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 7, at 77 (congruence “simplif[ied] constitutional jurisprudence,
the administration of justice, and cooperation between state and federal agencies.”).
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history. It was much easier to speak in terms of First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech than it was to the pedantic, but
technically correct “free speech component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”314 Congruence brought
with it The Federalist, other statements from the Framers of the
Constitution, and whatever drafting history there was for the
clause or amendment. Congruence brought additional legitimacy
to the Court’s decisions as it anchored the Court in the familiar tools
of interpretation. In the years since it moved to selective
incorporation, the Court has not hesitated to invoke the drafting
history or the context for the Bill of Rights as an aid to determining
the right as applied to the states, without the need to look to the
history or context for the Fourteenth Amendment.315
The Court’s own convenience, however, is a high price to pay
for the discordant textual analysis incorporation has brought.
Perhaps the Court has the convenience of the people in mind as
well. Federalism is complicated and, like trying to explain the
relationship between general relativity and quantum mechanics, it
is hard to explain to a public that is not steeped in constitutional
theory why one rule for freedom of speech applies to the federal
government, but another applies to the states.316 Congruence is the
path of least resistance.
2. The Will to Power
The move to congruence is fundamentally rooted in the will to
power. As the Court, clause by clause, declared the Constitution
congruent, it also expanded its own jurisdiction, without the need of
constitutional amendment or facilitating legislation. Incorporation does
not just give the Court control over subject matter; it gives the Court
power over a different level of government. For example, the
Court’s first case incorporating a provision of the Bill of Rights,
314. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973) (referring to “the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause”).
315. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 603–05 (2008) (Second
Amendment); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–50 (2004) (Sixth Amendment);
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 336–40 (2001) (Fourth Amendment); BrowningFerris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264–68 (1989) (Eighth
Amendment); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–92 (1983) (Establishment Clause);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–21, 827–32 (1975) (Sixth Amendment).
316. Cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (in federalism, “[t]he Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”).
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Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago,317
declared just compensation claims to be within the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and signaled the end of
Barron. Yet, as we have seen, the Court had nothing to contribute
on the subject of takings, and it affirmed the Illinois court’s
judgment, finding no fault with the grounds on which that court
had decided the case. Chicago, Burlington, as a takings precedent,
was trivial, but when considered in terms of the Court’s
jurisdiction, it is of enormous consequence. It established the
principle that all takings cases, whether federal or state, are
reviewable in the Supreme Court.
Additionally, at every turn in the evolution of the modern
incorporation doctrine, the Court has pushed in the direction of
reserving greater power for itself. The Court began by denying that
it had the power to impose the Bill of Rights on the states. In the
absorption era it discovered that it had such authority, but it was
constrained by the general nature of due process, not by the
strictures of the particular provisions in the Bill of Rights. Finally,
the Court declared an end to the two-track theory and awarded
itself the power to make a single rule applicable to the states and
the federal government, a rule convenient for the Court and more
restrictive for the states. It overruled dozens of cases to get to that
point. Furthermore, the Court’s power-awarding stance is not over.
The Court continues to uncover provisions that come within its
incorporation umbrella. At some point, we likely will see the end
of the selective incorporation era and the beginning of full
incorporation of the Bill of Rights—and perhaps provisions beyond
the Bill of Rights.
Incorporation has profoundly affected our federalism. As
discussed in the prior section, the Court may have over-enforced
the Bill of Rights against the states, depriving them of the
compromises at the founding. There is a second, important effect.
The states had their own constitutions. Some of those constitutions
had served as models for the U.S. Constitution, including the Bill of
Rights;318 many constitutions that post-dated the U.S. Constitution

317. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). The
case is discussed in supra Section III.B.1.
318. See THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, JAY S. BYBEE & A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT, POWERS
RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH
AMENDMENTS 14–15 (2006).
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had imitated it in their own bills of rights. Through incorporation
the Court has preempted state constitutions and, by extension, state
courts. It renders state constitutions nearly irrelevant, except to the
extent that state courts construe their constitutions to be more
protective than the corresponding federal right. With each
successive incorporated clause, the Court expands its own
jurisdiction over the states without the possibility of check from the
political branches.319 Congruence comes at the expense of state
constitutionalism, which after incorporation either operates as a
one-way ratchet or not at all.320
Incorporation has profoundly affected separation of powers as
well. First, as explained, in some instances the Court has overenforced certain clauses against the federal government and underenforced others. Even more importantly, the congruence principle
has undermined Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment under Section 5. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,321 the Court
upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that nullified
state English literacy requirements. Just seven years earlier, the
Court had held that such requirements violated neither the
Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendments.322 Whether the judiciary
would find the state literacy provisions constitutional, Congress
could “prohibit the enforcement of the state law” under its Section
5 authority.323 The so-called Morgan power presumably meant that
Congress was free to take its own view what the Fourteenth
Amendment meant, so long as its view was more state-restrictive
or prophylactic. This held out the possibility that Congress could
start down its own dual-track reading of the Bill of Rights.
The Court pretermitted that theory in City of Boerne v. Flores.324
In the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),325 Congress

319. See also David A. Strauss, Commentary, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.1457, 1459 (2001) (“[A] case can be made that, subject to only
a few qualifications, our system would look the same today if Article V of the Constitution
had never been adopted and the Constitution contained no provision for formal amendment
. . . . [C]onstitutional amendments have not been an important means of changing the
constitutional order.”).
320. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
321. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
322. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959).
323. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649.
324. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2020).
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provided that the federal government and the states “shall not
substantially burden” a person’s exercise of religion unless the state
could demonstrate that the burden was “in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest” and was “the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”326 The
Court had rejected that test in Employment Division v. Smith.327 In
City of Boerne, the Court struck down RFRA insofar as it applied to
the states, in the process limiting Congress’s Morgan power: Section
5 does not empower Congress to “make a substantive change in the
governing law,” but “extends only to ‘enforcing’ the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”328 While Congress must have “wide
latitude” in determining remedies, it is not free to change the
substantive law. “There must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.”329 As RFRA was inconsistent with
Employment Division v. Smith, it was not an appropriate remedy for
free exercise violations by the states and was, accordingly, “beyond
congressional authority.”330
Congruence was complete: Just as the states could not deviate
from whatever restrictions the Court read into the Bill of Rights,
Congress too had to conform its own enforcement to how the Court
defined “liberty” in the Due Process Clause. Incorporation treated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as if it were
self-executing. That gave the Court great leeway to decide what to
pour into the Clause. At the same time, as the Court insisted on a
congruent rule for federal and state governments, it restricted
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress could define the means for enforcing the strictures of the
Due Process Clause, but by treating the Clause as self-executing,
the Court gets to determine what Congress can enforce.331

326. Id. § 2000bb-1(a), (b) (2020).
327. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–88 (1990).
328. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508, 519. See also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
329. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
330. Id. at 536.
331. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Textualism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV.
1237, 1256–57 (2017) (criticizing the Court).
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CONCLUSION
Incorporation may be the most important development in
constitutional law since the adoption of the Bill of Rights itself. It
has vastly expanded the coverage of the U.S. Constitution and
diminished the need for state constitutions and the role of state
supreme courts. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that it
was the province of the judiciary “to say what the law is.”332 But the
Marbury power included the power to say what “is not law,”333
and incorporation has placed in the hands of the Supreme Court
control over nearly every important question of public policy. In
a nation devoted to a written constitution—Marbury called it our
“greatest improvement on political institutions”334—that is an
enormous power to have hung on the seventeen words of the Due
Process Clause.
We have the right to expect more from the Court. The Court’s
two-track, absorption theory gave it some flexibility with respect
to both due process and federalism. But the Court’s mid-Twentieth
Century shift to the congruence principle confounded our
federalism and stifled any due process innovation. It puts the Court
in the role of Procrustes, forcing the states and the federal
government into a single mold. The Court’s current theory of
incorporation remains selective only because it is an ad hoc rule in
search of a theory.
The Court may yet again modify its theory of incorporation.
The pressure from the academy to abandon the Due Process Clause
as the vehicle of incorporation and to embrace the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has increased enormously in recent years.
Reforming incorporation around the Privileges or Immunities
Clause may or may not result in substantive changes in our
approach to the Bill of Rights, but it would at least force the Court
to confront serious questions about the Constitution that it has thus
far, skillfully and embarrassingly, avoided.

332. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 178. See Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 1397 (2019).
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